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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines public opinion towards membership in the EU, before and after the
2008 global economic crisis, in the newest member states to join the institution in 2004 (the
Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and
Slovenia) and 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania). Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1989,
socialist economies and communism maintained a citizenry that never experienced
unemployment and that did not have a political voice. Because free-market economic policies
and democratic values are new to these countries, public opinion regarding membership in a
supranational organization that promotes and fosters these ideals is important to study. Data from
the Eurobarometer Public Opinion Survey spring waves 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010, the
Inter-Parliamentary Union, the World Bank, and Eurostat are used to measure multiple indicators
of support for membership in the EU. Ordered logistic regression and means comparison
analyses are employed to measure the effect of national-level economic prospects, economic
winner/loser status, political party power, age, national identity, gender, and individual-level
political ideology on public opinion toward membership. The results demonstrate that multiple
indicators affect attitudes toward membership and that a negative shift in public opinion is
apparent following the 2008 global economic crisis. At the individual-level of analysis,
economic winner/loser status and national identity are significant in the predicted direction in all
five models. Age is a significant indicator of support only in 2008, 2009, and 2010. At the
aggregate-level, means comparison analyses and t-test statistics indicate that GDP annual growth
rates have a positive effect on attitudes toward membership in the EU. As GDP annual growth
iii

increases, approval of membership in the EU increases. Eurozone membership and
unemployment rates indicate varied support for membership in the EU, and the results of means
comparison analyses of political party power at the national-level are inconclusive and
exploratory in nature. With all findings considered, future studies can further examine the
implications and long-term effects of global financial crises on public opinion towards
membership in various international economic organizations.
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INTRODUCTION

Since the first enlargement of the European Union (EU) in 1973 when Denmark, Ireland,
and the United Kingdom gained membership, the causes of euroscepticism have remained highly
studied. Many factors contribute to citizen approval or disapproval of membership in the EU in
both member states and candidate countries. In 1950, when Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands first formed the European Economic Community (EEC)—
later to become known as the EU—there were already plans to expand the Community to other
western European countries (European Commission 2014a). The last two enlargements taking
place in 2004 and 2007 introduced twelve new countries to the EU, including Cyprus, the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and
Romania (European Commission 2014a). The newest member states (excluding Cyprus and
Malta) share a history of communist rule and a transition to democracy after the collapse of the
Soviet Union during the late 1980s. Cyprus and Malta, on the other hand, share a history of
British colonial rule up until the 1960s. This thesis seeks to answer two main research questions:
how have attitudes towards membership in the EU among new member states changed since the
2008 global economic crisis? And, what do these changes in attitude mean for the future and
legitimacy of the EU?
In 2009, the Lisbon Treaty was signed which established new powers for the European
publics. The treaty states that the next official to replace José Manuel Barroso in the fall of 2014
as the president of the European Commission (EC) must be endorsed by the European Parliament
(EP). Because the EP is elected by European voters, the voters have a direct influence on who
1

will become the next president of the EC (European Parliament 2014). The 2014 EP elections,
taking place on May 22nd through the 25th, were the first to be held since the signing of the
Lisbon Treaty. Participation in EP elections following the global economic crisis has given
citizens the power to evaluate the EU leaders’ efforts to address the economic crisis that
continues to plague the Eurozone and other member states. According to Adam Nathan, the
Deputy Director of European Influence (an organization to maintain a cohesive Europe), the
presence of eurosceptic parties in the EP is considered a good thing for democracy. However, if
the percentage of eurosceptic MEPs exceeds 20 percent and begins to approach 30 percent, then
“Europe is doing something wrong” (Nathan 2014). The results of the 2014 EP election are
indicative of rising euroscepticism in the region which could ultimately mean disaster for the
institution.
The effect of national economic health on citizen approval of governments and political
leaders is not new to the field of political science. From an individual’s economic well-being to
the health of the state economy, citizens use fiscal cues to determine whether or not they support
the leaders of their country or their current government (Anderson 2000; Dorussen and Taylor
2002; Powell and Whitten 1993; Whitten and Palmer 1999). The literature on economic voting
frequently references the responsibility hypothesis. It claims that voters place blame or reward
for economic performance on the government and hold politicians or incumbents responsible for
the rising and falling economy (Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000). The EU is an example of a
supranational organization that experiences the same forces that national governments do during
election cycles. This research is important for many reasons. Myriad public opinion surveys
measure approval ratings of membership in the EU while countries are in the candidacy period
2

and after they gain membership. Using the Eurobarometer public opinion surveys, statistical
analyses will be conducted in order to examine the effect of the 2008 global economic crisis on
attitudes towards the supranational entity.
Because the stability of the EU rests in the support that it receives from its member states,
this research remains relevant and very important. The legitimacy of an institution is threatened
when members begin to foster negative evaluations of that institution (Cichowski 2000). David
Easton (1965; 1975) described three levels of political support—support for “political
authorities, the regime, and the political community” (Dalton 2008, 239). If citizens demonstrate
decreased levels of support for political authorities, then they will vote those authorities out of
office. However, if support decreases for the regime or political community, the political
implications become more urgent—this is when a loss of legitimacy can occur.
The newest members of the EU with a history of communist or colonial rule are critical
to examine because although over two decades have passed since the dissolution of the Soviet
Union and gaining independence, its legacy continues to affect public opinion and political
behavior. While these countries have transitioned to independent democracies and free-market
economies, the democratic values that are apparent in the older member states are not firmly
established yet in the sample countries. The communist legacy has left “an us (the people) versus
them” (the government, institutions, and members of parliament) mentality in the citizens of
these countries leaving them skeptical of integration (Guerra 2013).
The literature (Anderson and Reichert 1995; Cram 2009; 2012; Deutsch et al. 1957;
Dobratz 1993; Esparza 2010; Hooghe and Marks 2009; Inglehart and Rabier 1978; Lewis-Beck
and Stegmaier 2007) has identified a number of variables that have an effect on attitudes towards
3

membership in post-communist member states. Institutional, economic, and cultural factors all
influence public opinion on membership in the EU. The research, however, has overlooked how
the 2008 global economic crisis has changed attitudes toward the Union and what this means for
the future of the institution. This thesis seeks to fill this gap. The first chapter investigates the
previous literature on multiple variables that affect public opinion toward membership in the EU.
The health of the national economy and the economic vote, national and cultural identity,
national level political party power, and value change are considered. Chapter two discusses the
various economic and political transitions that the sample countries underwent following the
dissolution of Soviet Union. GDP annual growth rates and unemployment are two economic
indicators that are examined in depth. Chapter three introduces the data and methods for the
study and chapters four and five examine the results of the quantitative analysis and conclusions
of the thesis.
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CHAPTER ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW
The EU, was established in 1957 to foster economic cooperation between its member
states. The 2008 global economic crisis brought the sample countries—the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Cyprus, Malta, Bulgaria, and
Romania—of the Union into a recession deeper than any of the countries have experienced since
the 1930s. The gross domestic product (GDP) of the EU27 dropped 4.5 percent in 2009 and has
not yet risen to the level it was prior to the crisis (Eurostat 2013). Previous studies (Anderson
2000; Campbell et al 1960; 2010; Dorussen and Taylor 2002; Duch and Stevenson 2008; LewisBeck and Paldam 2000; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2008; Powell and Whitten 1993) have shown
that economic factors influence the voting behavior of citizens in democracies throughout the
world. Therefore, the cooperation of member states with the EU is contingent on public support
of the various neoliberal economic and social policies backed by the institution.

The Economy and the Economic Vote
A plethora of studies on economic voting exists in the literature. Beginning with
Campbell et al.’s seminal work The American Voter, scholars continue to study how the
economy affects vote choice in national elections. The classic economic voting hypothesis posits
that individuals reward or punish incumbent politicians based on their retrospective evaluations
of the status of the economy (Butler and Stokes 1969; Campbell et al 1960; Fiorina 1978; Key
1966; Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2011; Stokes 1963). If economic
conditions are bad, the incumbent party in the succeeding election suffers (Weatherford 1978).
5

The retrospective economic voting model suggests that citizens are concerned with the results of
current economic policies and punish the incumbent party responsible; on the other hand, the
prospective voting model evaluates proposed policies by the incumbent party to fix the economic
situation (Fiorina 1978). The latter model suggests that voters act on the promises made by
candidates, whether an incumbent or not, regarding how they will address the state of the
economy (Clarke and Stewart 1994; Lewis-Beck 1990). While this model has been explored, the
retrospective voting hypothesis remains the dominant theory in the literature.
Most of the early research on voting behavior (Campbell et al 1960; Key 1966) focuses
on the United States and other developed western societies. However, recently scholars have
paid more attention to how economic situations affect elections in transitional and less developed
democracies (Coffey 2013; Duch 2001; Fidrmuc 2000; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2008;
Stegmaier and Lewis-Beck 2009; 2011). The recent availability of public opinion surveys and
data regarding citizen evaluations of governments in these transitional democracies have made
these studies possible. With recent democratization in the sample countries, it is important to
consider factors such as poverty, a “fragile” middle class, poor governing abilities, and the
distribution of wealth, and how these variables affect voting behavior—specifically the economic
vote—and elections (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2008, 304). Because democracy and freemarket economic policies were recently instituted in these countries, communication between the
citizenry and the government may not be as well-established as in western democracies. For this
reason, exploring the economic vote in such societies is vital and will provide insight to the
saliency of economic issues in CEE countries and how citizens attribute reward or blame to
national and supranational entities.
6

To begin, it is important to examine how class factors affect the economic vote.
Fluctuations in the economy (annual GDP growth, unemployment rates, and per capita income)
affect the various groups in society differently. An individual’s position in the class structure
influences his or her outlook on economic events and the policy alternatives proposed by
political elites (Hamilton 1972; Parkin 1971; Rainwater 1974; Weatherford 1978). For instance,
blue collar workers usually hurt more by economic recessions than white collar workers for
many reasons. Evidence for this can be observed in unemployment rates, for instance; the former
group of individuals typically experiences unemployment rates which double those of the latter
group (Weatherford 1978). Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2007) find that the economy compared
to other social issues and partisan identification repeatedly has a greater impact on vote choice.
Unemployment as a measure of the health of the economy is found to affect voting consistently
in the research (Bell 1997; Fidrmuc 2000; Gibson and Cielecka 1995; Pacek 1994). Rising
unemployment rates in CEE countries lead to higher levels of support for the opposition party
and lower levels of support for the main incumbent candidate (Gibson and Cielecka 1995). This
finding supports the responsibility hypothesis and indicates that an economic vote is apparent in
transitional democracies.
In questioning whether transitional countries follow the economic voting model as in
advanced democracies, research has found that less developed democratic systems function as
older systems do in that citizens do reward or place blame on political officials for the failure or
prosperity of the national economy (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2008). Specific economic
variables that sway vote choice have been discussed in the literature. Lewis-Beck and Nadeau
(2011) identify and find evidence for three effects of the economy on vote choice. First, the
7

economy as a valence issue maintains an overall consensus. Voters want the economy to
function at optimal levels; no voter desires bad economic conditions especially when those
conditions have a direct effect on his/her household, giving height to the saliency of the issue.
Second, the economy as an issue position interacts with ideological views. Citizens on the left of
the ideological spectrum favor more government intervention in the economy while those on the
right prefer less. Lastly, in discussing how one’s patrimony affects his/her propensity to use the
economic vote, the authors find evidence that one’s assets rather than income affect vote choice.
Position and patrimony are particularly intriguing in the examination of CEE countries.
For instance, the wealth of an individual affects whether he/she is more or less likely to support
the “jurisdiction encompassing out-groups” (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 12). Members of the “outgroup” (individuals who have lower incomes and require assistance—such as welfare programs
from their national governments) will tend to support membership in the EU. At the aggregate
level, individuals living in countries that receive more direct and indirect economic benefits from
membership in the EU will demonstrate higher levels of support for their country’s membership
in the EU (Anderson and Reichert 1995). The EU’s enforcement of redistributive policies
generates these sentiments; this will be discussed later in this chapter. The in-group/out-group
analysis can be paralleled with economic winner/loser status.
Fidrmuc (2000) provides classifying characteristics for which individuals fall into which
category. Economic winners are typically white-collar workers who are educated at the college
level, whereas economic losers have lower levels of education, are unemployed, or are bluecollar workers who find most of their employment in the agricultural sector. In a comparison
between skilled and unskilled laborers, Gabel (1998) finds evidence that individuals who are
8

competitive in the liberalized market (skilled laborers) will garner more positive evaluations of
the institution compared to those who are less competitive (unskilled). The EU as an economic
entity provides prospects of economic security for lower income families. At the same time, it
provides opportunities for white collar workers and entrepreneurs for trade liberalization and
expanded markets. The literature does not suggest that any group of individuals in the societies
and countries disapprove of membership in the EU solely based on fluctuations of the economy.
However, it does suggest that membership in the Union influences skilled and unskilled laborers
differently depending on their competitiveness in the open market which in turn affects public
opinion (Gabel 1998). I expect that the effect of economic winner status on decreased support for
membership in the EU will be weaker after the 2008 global economic crisis compared to
economic losers.
Economic expectations also significantly affect how individuals evaluate institutions and
governments; this directly shapes public opinion on EU membership. Because integrative
reforms and redistributive policies vary across the region, these policies transform various
groups in the population inconsistently. The equality of opportunity (EOp) theory, originally
posited by Roemer (1998), suggests that circumstances and individual efforts are factors
independent of each other and that affect a citizen’s economic success (Dunnzlaff et al. 2010). If
every citizen in every country is given the same circumstances (opportunity), then their financial
well-being becomes completely contingent on the effort that they are willing to put forth to
achieve economic gains. In 2000, the EU launched the Lisbon strategy that aimed to address
issues of globalization and to improve the workings of the EU as a monetary union (European
Commission 2014b). In order to achieve these goals, the Union implements common policies
9

among all member states while allowing each country to implement their own structural reforms.
In a sense, the opportunity presented by the EU for each country is the same; however, structural
differences in tax and distribution schemes among nations creates discrepancies in economic
situations among the citizens of member states. The EU through Structural and Cohesion Funds
aids less developed regions by redistributing money from economically well-off member states
to economic losers (Ehin 2001). In 2012, 45.9 percent of EU total spending went towards
sustainable growth that includes job creation, competitiveness, economic growth, and improved
quality of life (European Commission 2014b). Citizens of member states with a higher GDP
annual growth rate will be less supportive of EU membership before and after 2008 compared to
citizens in member states with lower GDP annual growth rates; this will be the case because
countries with stronger independent economies have a lesser need to rely on the EU for
economic support than countries with weaker economies. Regarding unemployment rates as an
economic indicator, countries with higher unemployment will be more supportive of EU
membership before and after 2008 compared to citizens in countries with lower unemployment
rates. The logic behind this argument remains the same as GDP annual growth as an economic
indicator of support—employment opportunities made available by membership in the EU are
more attractive to citizens in countries that suffer from a lack of jobs within their own country of
residence.
Democratic accountability is another issue that affects how citizens in member states of
the EU evaluate their national and supranational governing institutions. The question is whether
or not citizens are able to place blame on the proper government officials for the health of the
economy and impact of policies. Hellwig and Samuels (2007) suggest that the economic
10

openness the EU directly affects the citizens’ of member states propensity to place blame on
national government officials for the health of the economy. As globalization continues to
expand and open world economies, the connection between the economic vote and the evaluation
of the national economy begins to dissolve. An inclination for voting cues is apparent when
citizens become unable to distinguish between their national economy as an independent actor
and its relationship in the global economy. Political parties use this lack of knowledge to their
advantage with issue framing to influence public opinion in a particular direction. This will be
discussed further in this chapter.
The EU provides a clear example of how the political economy of globalization affects
domestic politics. For members of the EU, if the economy is doing poorly, politicians can shift
blame to the supranational institution or other factors that are beyond their control (Hellwig and
Samuels 2007). Because the role of each institution (national governments and the EU) is not
salient, this could lead to citizens’ inability to assign blame to the proper party and therefore
unable to reward or punish the politicians of their country. Kayser and Peress (2012) find that in
instances when a global economic crisis is occurring, citizens are much less likely to turn against
their government than when only their country’s economy is suffering. That being said, after
2008, I expect that public opinion towards the EU as a whole will decline in all member states. A
country’s economic position in the international context also influences citizens’ perceptions of
their government. Therefore, at the aggregate level, countries with higher GDP annual growth
rates after 2008 will demonstrate greater levels of support for membership in the EU compared
to countries with lower GDP annual growth rates.

11

Identity
An individual’s identity (national and cultural) is another variable that changes public
opinion on membership in the EU (Cram 2009; 2012; Esparza 2010; Hooghe and Marks 2009;
Risse 2003). How one identifies in society can change rapidly especially during times of political
and economic transformation. Citizens of CEE countries have experienced control by the Soviet
Union, gaining independence, and integration with the EU within less than fifty years. Therefore,
it is important to examine sub-national, national, and supranational identities, because of their
prevalence and influence on public opinion towards integration in the EU in the newest member
states (Cram 2009).
The seminal work by Deutsch et al. (1957) suggests that integration reinforces national
identities. Political integration, they claim, becomes an issue when citizens or governments begin
demanding “greater capabilities, greater performance, greater responsiveness, and more adequate
services” (Deutsch et al. 1957, 87). After the fall of communism and the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, successor states were left with underdeveloped economies and dysfunctional governing
systems. With less than twenty years to develop their economies and governments, candidate
states of the EU in 2004 and 2007 were offered an opportunity for substantial growth towards
democracy and a free-market. When a government provides a foundation for a more attractive
lifestyle, political loyalty can be transferred from a national to a supranational government
(Deutsch et al. 1957). Determining what an individual considers a more attractive way of life
poses issues of measurement. However, European public opinion surveys, specifically the
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Eurobarometer, ask multiple questions about if and how much individuals identify with being
European.
Membership in the EU is new for the most recent countries to join the institution in 2004
and 2007. Conflicting arguments on how easily and quickly a European identity can be
established are discussed in the literature. Some argue that citizens in the newer member states
garner more nationalist sentiments over loyalty to the EU because a deep-rooted European
identity has not yet dissolved their cultural values (Smith 1995). Deutsch et al. (1957) claim that
identity is developed when individuals come to a consensus that social problems need to be
addressed and that peaceful cooperation is the only way to accomplish such change. The latter
argument suggests that current global events and issues are more influential of identity and that
national borders will not hinder the development of an international identity if a common social
problem needs to be addressed. Hooghe and Marks (2009, 2) argue that “the functional need for
human co-operation rarely coincides with the territorial scope of community.” In theory, then,
supranational organizations, such as the European Union, that practice governance over national
bodies, conflict with community and national identities. Cram (2009) argues further that
European integration does not necessarily mean that the loss of a national identity is inevitable.
Rather, membership in the institution reinforces national identities while maintaining European
pride; these identities blend together while remaining separate in what Risse (2005) calls a
“marble cake model.” Responses to public opinion surveys may suggest that citizens in one
country may not feel as blended in national and European identities as citizens in other countries.
National factors that influence feelings of identity and public opinion on membership in
post-communist member states are argued to be accountable for these discrepancies. Risse
13

(2003) argues that the adoption of the euro as national currency has an effect on citizens’
identification. By eliminating the monetary unit that is solely used within a country and
implementing the use of an international currency, a sense of European community is
established; citizens of a country are not isolated because of this economic difference but rather
become a part of an international community upon its implementation. Of the sample countries,
Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Malta, Slovenia, and Slovakia are all euro sharing; the Czech Republic,
Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania have all maintained their national
currencies. Building from Risse’s argument, I expect that the former group of countries express a
more enthusiastic view towards membership in the EU, and the latter group a more eurosceptical
stance on the issue after 2008.

Political Parties
Political parties are another significant determining factor of public opinion towards
membership in the EU. Because European issues have low salience, citizens in member states
rely on party cues to develop opinions on various policies set forth by the institution. In this
sense, national level political parties can frame issues to sway opinions in either a eurosceptical
or a pro-European direction, which suggests that political figures and parties in charge of a
nation will exert substantial influence on public opinion during their time in office.
In examining the Czech Republic, Esparza (2010) discusses how political parties
influence opinions in four issue dimensions: democratic growth, national identity, the economy,
and national security. Regarding these four elements, he found that parties are not typically
14

placed on the left or right of the ideological spectrum on all issues—they represent varying
positions, both liberal and conservative, depending on the topic. Throughout the duration of this
section, I will use the terminology ‘gal’ and ‘tan’ to refer to green/alternative/libertarian and
traditional/authoritarian/nationalist philosophies, respectively (Vachudova 2008).
In the case of the Czech Republic, Esparza (2010) analyzes four parties: the Civic
Democratic Party (ODS), the Social Democratic Party (ČSSD), the Christian Democratic Party
(KDU-ČSL), and the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM). The ideological
positions of these parties follow: ODS falls right of center, ČSSD is left of center, KDU-ČSL is
positioned in the center, and KSČM is also positioned left. Of these parties, ODS and KSČM are
Eurosceptic and ČSSD and KDU-ČSL are pro-European. From this, it is clear that political
parties that are close in ideology on the left-right spectrum can have varying opinions towards
membership in the EU for multiple reasons. Regarding national identities and democratic
growth, political parties demonstrate less concern on membership in the EU than with issues
such as the economy and national security. In economic terms, parties that are placed on the right
of the ideological spectrum are pro-EU in that they support the promotion of the free-market and
free-trade; those on the left are more inclined to support market control and regulation by the
government. With respect to national security, parties on the right support membership in the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and a militarily interconnected Europe while parties
on the left demonstrate less support (rather a lack of need) for membership in the organization.
While national identity is not an issue of paramount importance in the approval or
disapproval of membership with the EU at the party level, these groups still use identities to
influence public opinion. CEE countries that have a strong presence of radical right ideologies
15

pose a threat to the growth of democratic philosophies. The Greater Romania Party (PRM) and
the New Generation Party-Christian Democratic (PNG-CD) express nationalist, authoritarian,
and xenophobic stances on various social and cultural issues (Sum 2010). By creating an “us”
versus “them” mentality in the electorate, parties are able to instill these nationalist identities
within the citizens of a country; this is the case in Romania, for example. These parties also view
the EU as an “overly bureaucratic” (Hainsworth 2008, 82) institution that threatens national
communities. In countries with a prevalence of right of center parties in parliament there should
be more euro-enthusiastic sentiments held throughout the public.
Hooghe and Marks (2009) also examine how parties use identity and economic interests
to influence public opinion on EU membership in post-communist member states. They argue
that political conflict provides the opportunity for parties to use communal identity to mobilize
the public. In CEE countries multiple issue positions are apparent. In countries that successfully
and immediately transitioned to liberal democracies after the demise of communism in 1989
such as Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia (now the Czech Republic), Latvia, Lithuania, and
Slovenia, right and ‘gal’ positions are typically seen. Countries that did not experience a
successful transition from authoritarianism to liberal democracy, as in Romania, Bulgaria, and
Slovakia, left and ‘tan’ positions are promoted by political parties (Vachudova 2008). The latter
group of countries following the dissolution of the Soviet Union
A fear of the loss of national sovereignty and identity is widespread across many political
parties that are right of the center in CEE countries. In the Czech Republic, where many view
membership in the EU as a “necessary evil” (Perron 2000, 22), resentment towards the Union is
a product of citizens feeling as though accession will result in a loss of national identity
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(Kopecky and Mudde 2000). Eurosceptical parties in the Czech Republic—the ODS and the
Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-RSČ)—reinforce these fears by promoting a pronationalist agenda through issue framing (Vermeersch 2010). If an electorate maintains strong
nationalist sentiments, then it is beneficial for a party to adopt a congruent platform in order to
secure votes. Politicians use historical events and national identities to reinforce anti-EU and proEU attitudes in order to establish a solid platform.
Not only do political parties frame issues in order to gain support from the electorate,
there is evidence that they are also very responsive to public preferences (Downs 1957; Hill and
Hurley 1999; Laver and Schofield 1990; Ray 2003: Schumpeter 1942). Therefore, it is difficult
to determine in which direction the causal arrow points. Whether political parties influence
public opinion through issue framing and voting cues or create a platform based on public
preferences, there is an undeniable governing factor that shapes public opinion for citizens who
have lower levels of knowledge about the EU and the international economy.

Value Change
The last indicator of support to be discussed is value change. Value change in CEE
countries has been explored consistently in the literature. From communism, to its collapse, and
the development of democracy and a free-market economy, the transitional regimes and citizens
who were subject to these changes have undeniably been affected. How these value changes
have influenced public opinion is a question to be considered especially when contemplating
membership in the EU. Conflicting arguments have been established on whether there is a
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generational effect on public opinion. Inglehart and Rabier (1978) (Anderson and Reichert 1995)
suggest that the younger and more educated publics will be more supportive of membership in
the EU and that older generations will demonstrate less support for the supranational institution.
Other scholars have found that there is no consistent age or generational effect on public opinion
over time (Çarkoğlu 2004; Dobratz 1993).
Inglehart (1981) proposes two hypotheses in his theory of value change—a scarcity
hypothesis, and a socialization hypothesis. The scarcity hypothesis posits that individuals
attribute value to items that are in short, or scarce, supply. The difficulty of obtaining the scarce
item is what magnifies the item’s worth. Once, the supply meets the demand, the item loses its
value. The socialization hypothesis, on the other hand, posits that the conditions that surround an
individual’s pre-adult life will shape the values that the individual holds during his/her adult life.
Political and socioeconomic conditions during the formative years of pre-adulthood are therefore
the most important aspects affecting political values held later on in life (Dalton 2008). The
socialization hypothesis will be focused on during the ensuing discussion of value change in the
post-communist member states of the EU.
Since WWII, Inglehart and Rabier (1978) claim that European mass publics have
developed more post-materialist values (Anderson and Reichert 1995) such as self-expression
and quality of life over economic and physical security. In order to establish the difference
between materialist and post-materialist values, Inglehart (1977) applies the logic behind
Maslow’s value hierarchy. Post-material values focus on aesthetic, intellectual, and concepts of
social belonging—philosophy, free speech, visually appealing cities, and political involvement
are items that post-materialists value. Materialist values are more concerned with safety and
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sustenance needs—strong defense, stable economies and economic growth are indicative of
materialist values (Dalton 2008). Looking at the EU solely as an economic entity would lead one
to conclude that younger generations who hold post-materialist values would be less likely to
support membership with the institution compared to older generations. Considering the EU as
an entity that promotes cosmopolitan values such as “social progress, social inclusion, social
protection, solidarity and social cohesion” would lend to another explanation that younger
generations would be more supportive of membership compared to older generations (Andor
2013, 3). From Inglehart’s argument it is difficult to substantiate a claim on a generational
divergence regarding public opinion on membership in the EU. Other researchers have sought to
address this issue.
Dobratz (1993) evaluates the relationship between post-materialism and support for EU
membership. He argues that older generations in older more industrialized member states—
specifically the original six members: Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and
the Netherlands—are more likely to support membership. The author posited that the older
generation of politicians who were present in the establishment of the EEC and who sought to
avoid further military conflict in Europe were going to be more supportive of an institution that
would ensure the prevention of a war outbreak later on in the region. The historical events that
these individuals lived through conditioned their response to their involvement with an
international economic community (Dobratz 1993). Three generations should be considered in
this analysis: those who lived under communist rule, those who lived through the transition and
the collapse of communism, and those who have grown up in an independent state with growing
democratic values and market liberalization. By examining these three generations, whether or
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not history affects public opinion on membership in the EU can be determined. History as a
determining factor of public opinion in older and younger generations deserves further
examination.
The communist legacy is expected to have a significant effect on older generations
regarding public opinion on membership in the EU. The repressive rule which older generations
experienced prior to the collapse and transition from communism conditioned their opinions and
involvement in the democratic process. The totalitarian effect instilled terror in the population
and atomized individuals to the extent that civil society did not exist (Bahry and Silver 1987;
Friedrich and Brzezinski 1956). Trust in institutions in general declined significantly during this
period which included trust in government and later trust in newly formed political parties. With
widespread distrust in institutions, I expect these citizens will be distrusting too of membership
in the EU.
Younger individuals who experienced the transitional period will be more optimistic
about membership in the institution. Because access to information for this generation was
greater than that of the generation before them, belonging to the international community became
more apparent to these individuals, and democratic values and a free-market became desirable.
In some post-communist states such as Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia, individuals protested
for a new government during the transitional period clearly indicating that they did not support
the previous communist rule (Bunce 2011). This generation and the generation to follow, which
did not experience communism or the transitional period, will be overall more likely to support
membership in the EU.
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The claim that younger, more educated publics will be more likely to support
membership in the EU is seemingly logical. The cognitive mobilization argument posits that
rising levels of education in recent decades provide younger generations with the information
necessary to evaluate the costs and benefits of membership in the EU. Information in postcommunist countries about global events has become easily obtainable due to technological
advancement (Inglehart and Rabier 1978, 86). Younger, educated citizens who belong to high
socio-economic status are not necessarily more supportive of membership in the EU because
they hold post-materialist values as Inglehart argues, rather they have the education and
information that is imperative to successfully assess the value of membership.
With the evidence at hand, it is difficult to make solid claims about a generational
difference regarding public opinion and membership in the EU. From Inglehart and Rabier
(1978) and Dobratz’s (1993) contradicting arguments on value change and public opinion, a
hypothesis can be developed in an either positive or negative direction. Perhaps, younger
generations will be less supportive of membership as Inglehart claims because they will view the
EU solely as an institution with economic interests or they will be more supportive because of
the other non-economic values that the institution promotes. The same assumption can be made
against Dobratz’s argument taking historical factors into consideration. Including this variable
will act as an exploratory addition to the research question in discussion.
From the literature it is clear that multiple factors should be considered when examining
public opinion toward membership in the EU. The 2008 global economic crisis is expected to
have a negative effect on how citizens evaluate membership. Prior to the economic crisis support
should be higher overall across the sample countries. Individual and aggregate level variables
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discussed throughout this literature review will have varying effects on opinions toward the
institution.
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CHAPTER TWO: FROM SOCIALISM TO CAPITALISM
During the 1990s, the CEE countries under observation experienced many challenges
including democratization, marketization, and state-building. Of particular interest are the
economic transitions and obstacles that each state had to overcome after the dissolution of the
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. New states emerging from the federations of
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)—including
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia—not only had to
democratize and rebuild their economies, they also had the undertaking of state building that
lagged their development (Haughton 2007). Already established states were able to focus on
economic reform and democratic growth immediately following the dissolution of the Soviet
Union while the countries listed above had to first build their governments from the ground up.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine by economic indicator how the new member states’
economies have been affected by EU membership and the 2008 economic crisis.
To begin, it is important to discuss the economic transition that each country in the
sample underwent during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The economic policies under
communist rule are starkly different from those implemented during the democratization and
marketization process in the CEE region after the end of the Cold War. Some countries in the
sample experienced more successful transitions, while others struggled with neoliberal policies
and the maintenance of social welfare systems and levels of employment. The varying transition
experiences will be further discussed in this chapter.
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Bohle and Greskovits (2007) identify three transition types that are apparent in the
region: the neoliberal, the embedded neoliberal, and the neo-corporatist types. The countries
falling into the first category (the Baltic States—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) experienced the
most radical implementation of neo-liberal policies while Slovenia experienced the least radical
implementation of such policies. Countries classified as the embedded neo-liberal type (Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) experienced the smoothest transitions from
communist regimes and socialist economic policies to democracy and a free-market. The policymakers in these states attempted to establish a medium between neoliberal economic policies and
socialist welfare programs (including industry subsidies) during the transition period. Lastly,
neo-corporatist countries continued to experience state control of various social programs after
the transition and the beginning stages of economic reform. Slovenia, for instance, during the
transition period, became an inclusionary democracy which is characterized by a strong activist
state and aggressive state actors (Acuna and Smith 1994). The transitions of each country are
important to consider because the initial stages of economic reform have determined the growth
of each country through the 1990s, gaining membership in the EU, and the economic crisis of
2008.
After gaining membership in the EU and NATO in 2004, the Baltic States passed directly
into what American economist Hyman Minsky calls the Ponzi stage. This stage in financial
cycles is characterized by domestic debt relationships (Sommers and Bērziņš 2011). The
financial cycle develops in the following way:
Economies start in balance, with industry paying for its expansion out of retained
earnings. Next, industry borrows money, but these debts can be paid out of earnings—the
‘hedge’ stage. Over time both real estate and industrial investment become increasingly
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debt leveraged, with banks taking a greater share of real wealth from the economy. After
this increased debt leveraging, only interest can be paid and not any amortization of the
principal. The Ponzi stage is reached when interest is simply added to the debt, so that
debt levels become detached from the underlying real economy of production to pay.
(Sommers and Bērziņš 2011, 124)
Prior to the implementation of neoliberal policies in these countries, post-Soviet economies were
debt-free with high levels of employment. The levels of debt incurred by Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania, after 2004 negatively affected their economies compared to the initial success that
they experienced after the transition period. Unemployment rates increased and GDP growth
plummeted during the economic crisis in these countries (see Figure 1). The radical
implementation of neoliberal policies and the extreme levels of confidence inspired by
membership in the EU and NATO could possibly have led to risk-taking behavior of political
elites in the Baltic States during the transition period and after 2004.
The countries classified as embedded neoliberals—the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
and Slovakia—experienced a different transition during the early 1990s and a different response
to membership in the EU and NATO. Unlike the Baltic States, political elites in this group of
countries did not have a clear image or idea of how to implement neoliberal economic policies
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Shields 2011). Foreign direct investment (FDI) became
the controlling factor of their economies and corruption in institutions led to citizens having low
levels of trust in the government and political elites (Shields 2011). After gaining membership in
the EU, populists in Poland became suspicious of foreign influence and feared that their culture
would be destroyed. The 2008 economic crisis reinforced this group of individuals’ fear and lack
of confidence in the EU.

25

The European Monetary System (EMS), developed during the 1990s, initially posed the
opportunity for greater market liberalization, free trade, and stable exchange rates for the
member states of the EU. The prospects of economic growth were endless and the
implementation of a single currency in 1999 provided numerous benefits for the euro-sharing
countries (Papaioannou and Portes 2008). Of the twelve countries in the analysis, six—Cyprus,
Estonia, Latvia, Malta, Slovenia, and Slovakia—have adopted the euro as national currency. The
remaining countries continue to use their original currencies. While the latter group in the sample
is more vulnerable to international monetary fluctuations, the former benefits from larger
markets and low transaction costs.
Prior to the 2008 economic crisis, the euro “accounted for 20 percent of daily foreign
exchange rate transactions worldwide” (Hodson and Puetter 2013, 376). Second to the U.S.
dollar, the euro is the most widely used currency in the world, and is beginning to act
increasingly as an asset currency (Cohen 2008; Papaioannou and Portes 2008). Countries that
maintain their national currencies have developed banking systems in which transactions are
indexed in euros. The balance of payments keeps national economies linked through flows of
money, investment, and international trade (Cohen 2008). By adopting the euro as national
currency, member states benefit economically in national, corporate, and individual interests.
While the euro is a stable international currency, like all other economies in the world,
the 2008 global economic crisis threatened the strength and standing of the monetary unit. In
2010, the European Central Bank (ECB) launched the European Systemic Risk Board, which
was designed to safeguard the financial stability of the EU (Hodson 2011). The economic and
sovereign debt crises, Hodson and Puetter (2013) argue, have negatively affected confidence in a
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single monetary unit and predict that the euro is likely to be abated if member states are unable to
find a solution to the debt crisis that currently plagues the Eurozone. While the countries that
have adopted the euro remain safer economically in the international context, doubts about a
single currency are now surfacing in the region, which could spell disaster for the EMS and the
economic relationship among the euro-sharing countries (Hodson and Puetter 2013).
Analyzing citizens’ responses to the neoliberal policies that political elites drafted and
enforced during the initial transition period is another main focus of this chapter. The economic
conditions after the implementation of lustration laws—which aimed to remove all communist
policies from economic systems of post-Soviet member states—did not initially elicit a positive
response from the citizenry of CEE. Political discontent grew as unemployment rates increased,
along with the rising prices of basic goods such as of bread, fuel, and rent (Haughton 2007). CEE
electorates initially believed that privatization was intended to benefit politicians while the public
was left to struggle with the loss of jobs and the discontinuation of generous welfare
arrangements that existed under communist rule (Haughton 2007; Sommers and Bērziņš 2011).
With struggling economies, the initial prospect of membership in the EU evoked a positive
response at the citizen and elite levels. During the pre-accession period, the Program of
Community Aid to the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe (PHARE) offered financial
support to CEE countries and various incentives for cooperation with the Union such as liberal
and open trading arrangements (Haughton 2007). After accession, structural and cohesion funds
continued to influence positive evaluations of membership in the region.
Accounting for 11.3% to 25% of CEE annual GDP between 2007 and 2012, the structural
and cohesion funds distributed by the EU are a vital component of the economic equation in the
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region (KPMG Central and Eastern Europe 2013). The three main operational programs under
structural and cohesion funds of the European Union are the European Regional Development
Fund (ERDF), the Cohesion Fund (CF), and the European Social Fund (ESF). ERDF promotes
economic and social cohesion, CF focuses on major environmental projects and renewable
energy, and ESF was established to reduce disparities in prosperity and living standards among
EU member states (KPMG Central and Eastern Europe 2013). The distribution of these funds
among CEE member states varies mostly by the population of each country; countries with larger
populations receive larger allocations of each fund. Member states are able to receive fund
distribution if they comply with the economic regulations set forth by the EMS. However,
enforcement from the supranational body is difficult because not all regulations are binding and
the various economic bodies of the EU do not have the authority to enforce such laws.
In an attempt to accomplish compliance of economic policies drafted under the Lisbon
Treaty in 2007, the European Commission (EC) has developed two programs—the Broad
Economic Policy Guidelines and the Stability and Growth Pact. The former, endorsed by the
Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN), is non-binding in nature and only acts as a
recommendation body for member states’ economic policy to fall in line with the policies drafted
by the Commission (Hodson and Puetter 2013). The latter is binding and requires that member
states “run budgets that are in balance or surplus over the medium term and deficits below 3
percent of GDP” (Hodson and Puetter 2013, 374). While the Stability and Growth Pact is
binding, ECOFIN is reluctant to enforce sanctions on member states that do not comply with the
budgetary rules and regulations—this is mostly because member states have not empowered the
institution to act as a sanctioning body. The ECB is another actor in the enforcement of
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economic regulations in member states. However, like ECOFIN, the ECB faces issues of
constrained authority in the region (Hodson 2011).
By evaluating the economic transitions of each country and their experiences through the
2008 global financial crisis, I will determine how economic indicators affect public opinion and
each countries relationship with the EU.

GDP Annual Growth Rate
To begin, GDP growth rates are the most important indicator of economic health in the EU
member states. When GDP grows, economic prospects for businesses, jobs, and employment are
positive; as GDP declines, economies begin to weaken and rely on economic stimulus through
borrowing and reliance on foreign investors in the case of CEE. Using data from the World
Bank, GDP growth rates from 2006 to 2010 can be examined for the twelve countries in the
sample. Figure 1 illustrates that from 2006 to 2008, all of the countries in the sample maintained
positive growth rates. While some declined and others increased throughout those three years,
they all remained over zero percent growth. In 2009, however, in all sample countries besides
Poland, negative growth rates are seen. While growth did not drop below zero percent in Poland
in 2009, the country still experienced a decrease in growth of 3.5 percent from 2008 to 2009. The
economies in all countries grew in 2010 placing them in a positive rate territory, except in Latvia
and Romania where the economies continued to shrink.
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Figure 1. GDP Annual Growth Rate (%) from 2006 to 2010
Source: World Bank Data 2013
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Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were the most drastically and negatively affected in 2009
in terms of GDP annual growth. The radical implementation of neoliberal policies during the
transition period and the debt crisis that these countries underwent in 2004 can explain the
economic instability following the onset of the economic crisis. The Baltic countries’ economies
grew substantially from the beginning to mid-2000s but declined most deeply in 2009.
Economists claim that the negative turn in the economy was the product of no gains in
production and high consumption that depended on foreign direct investment (Sommers and
Bērziņš 2011). The structure of these economies was bound to collapse as soon as the inflow of
foreign capital ceased.
Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic all remained between
negative 6.6 and negative 4.5 in growth in all five model years (-6.8, -6.6, -5.5, -4.9, and -4.5,
respectively). While Poland, Malta, and Cyprus never fell below -3.0 percent growth during or
after the crisis (+1.6, -2.7, -1.7 percent, respectively). The continual transformation of these
economies since the development of a market following 1989, created a buffer for the effects of
the economic crisis (Švihliková 2011). These countries, rather than radically reforming the
economy from socialist to a free-market after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, experimented
with various economic policies until they reached stability. The strength of their economies
compared to the Baltic States rested in supply-side economics rather than the reliance on foreign
capital inflows (Švihliková 2011).
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Table 1. GDP Annual Growth Rates, 2006-2010
2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Bulgaria

6.50%

6.40

6.20

-5.50

0.40

Cyprus

4.10

5.10

3.60

-1.70

1.30

7

5.70

3.10

-4.50

2.50

Estonia

10.10

7.50

-4.20

-14.10

2.60

Hungary

3.90

0.10

0.90

-6.80

1.30

Latvia

12.20

10

-4.20

-18

-0.30

Lithuania

7.80

9.80

2.90

-14.70

1.30

Malta

2.20

4.30

4.40

-2.70

2.70

Poland

6.20

6.80

5.10

1.60

4.10

Romania

7.90

6

7.90

-6.60

-1.60

Slovakia

8.30

10.50

5.80

-4.90

4.20

Slovenia

5.80

6.90

3.60

-8.00

1.40

Czech Republic

Source: World Bank Data 2013

Unemployment

Another important economic indicator to discuss is unemployment. In the socialist states
of the Soviet Union, full employment was maintained by the state; jobs and full-time wages and
salaries were secured for all citizens. However, after the transition to a capitalist society,
unemployment rates increased to a level never experienced before and citizens began to suffer
because of it. In focusing specifically on the time between 2006 and 2010, a few trends can be
observed. In every country, male and female unemployment rates decreased between 2006 and
2008. Following the crisis in 2009 and 2010, unemployment rates increased in every case.
Initially after the economic transition the Baltic States faced a slower decline in
employment compared to the other countries in the CEE region (Nesporova 2002). However,
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after 2008, these countries experienced drastic increases in unemployment compared to the other
countries in the sample. Figure 2 clearly demonstrates this trend. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania,
in 2009 and 2010, experienced the greatest increases in unemployment (an increase of 11.4
percent from 2008 to 2010 in Estonia, 11.3 percent in Latvia, and 12 percent in Lithuania) with
levels higher than any of the other countries in the sample. Neoliberal economic policy in the
Baltic States was not democratically agreed on nor discussed with the citizenry, rather political
and economic elites entirely enforced these policies after the transition.
Up until the economic crisis, the Baltic States in comparison to the other countries in the
sample enjoyed significant growth in terms of GDP and low rates of unemployment. Sommers
and Bērziņš (2011) suggest that the economic bind in these countries—in terms of national
debt—began in 2004, after the Baltic States gained membership with the EU and NATO and
developed a new confidence in the market. Slovakia and Poland also had considerably higher
unemployment rates from 2006 to 2010 compared to the other countries in the sample (almost
double those of the other sample countries at the lowest rates—typically experienced in 2008—
and the highest rates—in 2009 and 2010).
Gender and age are two variables that determine how individuals are affected by
unemployment rates (Cho and Newhouse 2011). The following sections will identify how these
various groups in the CEE region are afflicted by unemployment.
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Source: World Bank Data 2013
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Unemployment by Gender
Men and women in the labor force of CEE countries experience varying unemployment
rates. Rutkowski (2006) argues that the restructuring of the labor force in industry following the
political transition during the late 1980s, led to these disparities. In countries where heavy
industry is declining and the service sector is expanding, higher unemployment among men and
lower unemployment among women are apparent. Prior to the transition, a gender gap in the
labor force was not apparent, neither in pay rates, nor in the number of males and females
employed (Paci 2002). However, it is clear that in CEE societies today this does not remain the
case. Cho and Newhouse (2011) conclude similar findings—men suffer greater unemployment
rates in middle income countries following economic crises. Again, Cho and Newhouse (2011)
attribute this trend to the hard hit industrial sector and higher unemployment rates among men
during the pre-crisis years.
During economic recessions, in countries where women are mostly the secondary
earners of income in the household, lower rates of women participate in the workforce. Due to
the hardship of finding affordable childcare, women tend to choose not working (Nesporova
2002). The World Bank measures unemployment by the percentage of the labor force that is
without work but that is available and actively seeking employment (The World Bank 2013). It is
important to keep this in mind when considering unemployment as a determining factor of public
opinion towards membership in the EU in this analysis. Women in these situations, while
technically unemployed, are not actively seeking employment and therefore do not experience
the same pressures as those who are actively seeking work.
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Figure 3 illustrates unemployment trends for females in the sample countries from 2006
until 2010. Clearly, unemployment rates vary by country and fluctuate over the five year span. In
all cases, however, (excluding Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) unemployment rates
among women decreased steadily from 2006 to 2008. One possible implication for this trend is
that these four countries began to feel the impact of the global economic crisis sooner than the
other eight in the sample. In 2009, all of the twelve countries experienced increases in female
unemployment from 2008. The Baltic States were the hardest hit with doubling rates from 2008
to 2009 and increasing significantly thereafter in 2010.
In Malta, Hungary, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, similar trends can be seen
throughout the cases. Female unemployment in these cases remained between 6.4 and 10.7
percent throughout the five model years. Compared to the Baltic States, unemployment rates for
women remained high but steady between 2006 and 2010 in these sample countries. Romania,
Slovenia, and Cyprus experienced similar trends; however, in these cases unemployment rates
were lower between 2006 until 2010 (never falling below 4.3 or exceeding 7.2 percent in all
cases). Lastly, in Poland and Slovakia rates remained high over the five year span. In 2006, these
two countries experienced female unemployment rates similar to the Baltic States in 2010—they
decreased in 2007 and 2008, dropping even as low as 7.9 percent in Poland but increased again
in 2009 and 2010 higher than the other countries in the sample besides Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania.
Figure 4 demonstrates unemployment rates for the male labor market from 2006 through
2010. Similar to trends in the female workforce in the Baltic States, men experienced significant
increases in unemployment in 2009 and 2010 compared to 2006 through 2008. From 2008 to
2009 in these countries, male unemployment rates almost tripled in all three cases, and in 2010
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they continued to rise. Regarding male unemployment, different country group trends can be
seen in the data. Slovenia, Malta, the Czech Republic, and Cyprus overall experienced the lowest
rates of male unemployment from 2006 to 2010; unemployment in these cases never fell below
3.2 percent and never rose above 6.8 percent. Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania experienced
slightly increased rates compared to the former group of countries; in these cases unemployment
never fell below 5.5 percent and never exceeded 11.6 percent. Poland and Slovakia, similar to
trends seen in female unemployment remain high in comparison to the other cases in the sample
(besides the Baltic States in 2009 and 2010).
Finally, in a comparison between male and female unemployment by country case, three
major trends are apparent. In Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovenia from 2006 to 2008, women
experienced higher unemployment rates compared to men. From 2009 to 2010 in these cases,
higher unemployment rates can be observed for men compared to women. Female
unemployment rates remained higher than male rates from 2006 through 2010 in Cyprus, the
Czech Republic, Malta, Poland, and Slovakia. The opposite trend is apparent in the Baltic States,
and Romania. The cases that experienced increased male unemployment rates in 2009 and 2010
compared to female unemployment can be explained by the decrease in the industry sector
following the economic crisis. The cases where male unemployment rates continually exceed
female unemployment incite questions regarding the structural factors responsible for such
trends. The probabilistic likelihood that occupational differences in the labor force are
responsible for these unique trends is high.
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Figure 5 illustrates the division of the labor force for each country by occupation.
Agriculture, industry, and services are the three sectors that are observed. In Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania, the services sector (which is employed mostly by females) employs the majority of
the labor force. In Romania, the majority is shared by the agricultural and services sectors.
However, these labor force compositions do not provide enough evidence to explain why women
maintain lower unemployment rates in every year compared to men in these countries. In every
country (besides the Czech Republic where the majority of individuals are employed in industry)
the service sector employs the most individuals. The CEE economies that were previously
established on the industry sector through the Soviet period and the early 1990s, transitioned into
knowledge economies primarily built on the services sector as the leading force in economic
growth and labor. Females employ over one-third of the services workforce and only 15 to 16
percent of males work in this division. However, in only a few cases (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
and Romania) are male unemployment rates higher than female rates in all five model years
(Pollert 2005). Returning to the issue of the active role of women in the labor market, and the
cost effectiveness of women being employed in a household where men are the primary income
earners, lower levels of female involvement in the labor market explains the trend across most of
the cases of higher unemployment rates for females in CEE countries.

Unemployment by Age
Trends in unemployment rates for different age groups can also be observed in the
sample countries. Across the globe, youth unemployment rates are high. In the EU-27 alone
youth unemployment remained almost twice as high as the rest of the population until the end of
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2008 (European Commission 2014c). Since the economic crisis, in a market of uncertainty,
employers have been reluctant to make investments in employees if they expect the cost to be
greater than the benefit. Young people, ages fifteen to twenty-four, in EU member states,
therefore, have suffered the most from the economic crisis for the following reasons. These
groups of citizens generally lack the skills that many employers seek and their lack of
participation in the labor force inhibits their ability to gain the experience necessary to make
them desirable candidates. The second most affected age group are those ages twenty-five to
thirty-four (Hutengs and Stadtmann 2013). Hutengs and Stadtmann (2013) conclude that these
two cohorts are the most vulnerable to business cycle fluctuations in CEE economies. Cho and
Newhouse (2011) also find that in CEE countries, youth suffered greater unemployment rates
compared to adult workers following the 2008 economic recession. “Youth unemployment is
often double and triple that of the national unemployment rate, partly because young people
leave school without the skills needed to participate in today's knowledge economy” (UNICEF
2014).
The EC has identified the issue of youth unemployment and has taken action to counter
the effects of the economic recession. The European Employment Strategy and the Open Method
of Coordination have launched initiatives to enhance the employability of youth groups
throughout Europe (Martín 2012). The main objectives in tackling the issue are to employ 75
percent of the population ages twenty to sixty-four and maintain the dropout rate of schools
under 10 percent in secondary education (Martín 2012). The EC is less concerned with
employability at the individual level and more concerned with the regulation of social and
economic conditions of the labor market as a governmental responsibility.
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Figures 6 and 7 illustrate that both male and female youths (ages fifteen to twenty-four)
experience very high unemployment rates in all cases. The Baltic States, again, experience the
highest male youth unemployment rates. For female youths, however, in the cases Poland,
Romania, and Slovakia, the highest unemployment rates are observed. While the youth
populations of the sample countries experience higher unemployment compared to the rest of the
population for the reasons listed above, they are also affected by the same economic factors as
the general population.
Another variable to consider, which has not received much attention in the literature on
the 2008 global economic crisis, are unemployment rates in rural versus urban communities. Cho
and Newhouse (2011) identify that this variable and the current economic crisis have not been
analyzed; however, they rely on previous crises to draw empirical conclusions regarding how
sectorial conditions affect unemployment rates. It seems that individuals working in rural
communities, mostly in agriculture or for family businesses, feel the shock of economic crises
less so than those employed in urban cities. Employees in the latter group, overall, experience
decreases in salaries at the onset of economic crises, and women especially experience
significant wage declines (Cho and Newhouse 2011). This is an important factor to consider
when analyzing unemployment and the components that are most affected by. In the cases of
CEE, however, employment in agriculture is low. Therefore, an effect regarding this variable
might not be as clearly seen in the analysis.
The transition periods and economic reforms of each country are telling of their
economic standings today and during the five years under analysis. From the early 1990s
onward, it is important to analyze the stability of each country’s economy independently of other
nations and actors, and to determine how resilient they are to economic shocks. By examining
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these factors, one is able to resolve how public opinion in the different samples might be
determined by each nation’s economic well-being.
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CHAPTER THREE: DATA AND METHODS

Sample Countries
Twelve sample countries are included in this analysis: Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia
(see Appendix B for summary statistics). Of these twelve countries, six (Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia,
Malta, Slovenia, and Slovakia) have adopted the euro as national currency, while the other six
continue to use their own national currency; these five countries are considered euro-sharing.
Five models will be estimated for the years 2006 through 2010. Each model will include all of
the independent and control variables in an ordered logit regression analysis.

Dependent Variable
Public opinion on membership in the European Union is measured using data from the
Eurobarometer public opinion surveys in the years from 2006 to 2010. Five spring waves—data
are collected between March and May of each year—are included in this analysis. The first three
models for 2006, 2007, and 2008, will measure public opinion prior to the onset of the economic
crisis during the fall of 2008. The last two models for 2009 and 2010, will analyze opinions after
the market crash. For each survey, the same question is employed: “Generally speaking, do you
think that (OUR COUNTRY)’s membership in the European Union is…?” Respondents
claiming that membership in the EU is a “bad thing” are coded as 1, those in the neutral category
(neither good nor bad thing) are coded as 2, and the responses a “good thing” are coded as 3.
This will ensure reliability across all five models (see Appendix A for all question wording).
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Macro-Level Economic Indicators
Macro-level economic indicators will include GDP growth rates from 2006 to 2010, and
unemployment rates of the total population, males and females, and youth unemployment for the
same years. These data are collected from the World Bank.

Micro-Level Economic Indicator
At the micro-level, opinions on the health of the national economy will be measured
using data collected in the Eurobarometer public opinion survey. This variable will be
operationalized using the following question: “What are your expectations for the next twelve
months: will the next twelve months be better, worse or the same, when it comes to the economic
situation in (OUR COUNTRY)?” The “worse” category is coded as 1, the neutral category is
coded as 2, and the “better” category is coded as 3. A question regarding the current economic
situation in the country would be desirable to include in the ordered logit analysis. However, the
Eurobarometer public opinion survey does not ask such a question. Prospective economic
evaluations will be employed for the following reason: the importance of this study is to
determine what changing opinions could mean for the future policy-making process of the EU.
By examining how citizens expect economic conditions to be in the future, we can determine if
they believe future membership with the EU is a beneficial prospect.

Control Variables
Four control variables will be included in the analysis. National level party power, age,
national identity, gender, and economic winner/loser status will be operationalized in the
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following ways. To begin, national level party power will be measured by the ruling party (or
coalition) in parliament for each country in each model year. Information for this variable will be
gathered from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). Age, identity, gender, and economic
winner/loser status will be measured using data from the Eurobarometer survey. One aspect that
will be used to measure identity is whether or not the country is euro-sharing. Individuals
residing in Eurozone countries, I hypothesize, will feel more European and identify less with
their individual country compared to citizens in non-Eurozone member states. The survey also
includes multiple questions regarding one’s identity. The following question will be included in
the ordered logistic regression analysis: “What does the European Union mean to you
personally?” One response to this question is “loss of our national identity.” A dummy variable
will be created from this question to be included in the ordered logistic regression. Lastly, in
order to measure economic winner/loser status, the five models will include an individual level
prospective economic question following Herzog and Tucker’s (2009) model. The following
question will be included: “What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next
twelve months be better, worse or the same, when it comes to the financial situation in (YOUR
HOUSEHOLD)?” Again, the “worse” responses is coded 1, the “same” responses is coded 2,
and the “better” response is coded 3. All of the control variables will be included in an ordered
logistic regression analysis.

National Level Party Power in Post-Soviet Member States
By examining political party power in parliament in a given model year, I will be able to
determine the ideological influence of political elites on the citizenry. The literature review
identifies that citizens rely on political party cues in order to understand complex and less-salient
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political issues (Esparza 2010; Hellwig and Samuels 2007; Hooghe and Marks 2000;
Vermeersch 2010). At the individual level, citizen’s responsiveness to policy is contingent on the
relative importance of political and economic issues (Franklin and Wlezien 1997). For instance,
individual-level economic well-being (economic winner/loser status) is typically more salient to
citizens than the health of the national (or also, in this case, the international) economy.
Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009) argue that in post-Communist Europe political parties
clearly establish issue positions but that the salience of the issues depends on national conditions.
By examining the ever changing coalition governments of the CEE countries, case by case, I will
be able to determine how political parties came to power in parliament between 2006 and 2010
and how they remained in power.
Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, only one
political party reigned supreme in the Soviet Republics, the Communist Party. After gaining
independence, however, democratic parties that were right-of-center in political ideology on
economic issues began to emerge across the member states. Parties on the left still competed in
national elections, but the prevalence of right parties far outnumbered those on the left. The
following section will examine the political party structure and coalition building in the twelve
countries of the sample from 1989 until 2010. These data are collected from the InterParliamentary Union and the Political Handbook of the World.
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Table 2. Political Party Stance on EU Integration by Country
Bulgaria

Eurosceptical
Union of Communists in
Bulgaria, CA

Neutral

Euro-enthusiastic
NMSS, CB

Cyprus

AKEL, New
Internationalist Left,
DIKO

DISY

Czech
Republic

Free Citizens Party

ČSSD, KSČM , ODS,
KDU-ČSL, SZ

Estonia

Independence Party,
Center Party

Res Publica

Fidesz, LMP

Hungary
Latvia

National Alliance,
LNNK, ZZS

Lithuania

Order and Justice

Malta

Labour Party (MLP)—
eurosceptic prior to
accession

MLP (after Malta’s
accession MLP
developed a neutral
position on foreign
policy)

Poland

Congress of the New
Right, Real Politics
Union, National
Movement

Law and Justice, PO

Romania

PRM, New Republic

Slovakia

SNS, Freedom and
Solidarity, Conservative
Democrats of Slovakia

MSzP-SzDSz
JL, LPP, TP, LC

PN

PSD-PUR
HZDS

SDS, NSi, DeSUS,
SLS-SKD
Source: PARLINE Database, Political Handbook of the World 2005-2006
Slovenia

Slovenian National Party
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Bulgaria
Prior to the political and economic transition of Bulgaria in 1989, only two political
parties were existent in government, the Bulgarian Communist Party (KPB) and the Bulgarian
Agrarian National Union (BZS-AS). These two parties comprised the political entity known as
the Fatherland Front which included trade unions, individual citizens and the communist youth
movement (Bulgaria 2005). Complete control of government was maintained by these two
groups which left no room for other political parties to compete for representation. Electoral
rules, however, shifted after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the reformation of
government following thereafter. The newly enforced proportional representation system
allowed numerous political parties to compete in national elections and gain seats in parliament
by securing over four percent of the total vote.
In 1989, multiple opposition parties to the KPB began to emerge and coalitions in
parliament started to form. The main communist party of the country (KPB) changed its name to
the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) after the transition and continued to gain representation in
parliament in ensuing elections. By 2001, sixty-five parties were registered by the Central
Election Commission and thirty-six took part in the election (Bulgaria 2005). Within the past
decade the number of registered political parties has continued to grow in the country.
The 2005 National Assembly election resulted in seven political coalitions gaining seats
in parliament. The Coalition for Bulgaria (CB), the National Movement Simeon II (NMSS), the
Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS), the Attack Coalition (CA), the Union of Democratic
Forces (UDF), the Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria (DSB), and the Bulgarian People’s Union
(BPU) all met the necessary threshold (four percent) of votes to gain representation. The CB
(30.95 percent of the vote and eighty-two seats), NMSS (19.88 percent of the vote and fifty-three
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seats), and DPS (12.81 percent of the vote and thirty-four seats) maintained majority
representation in government while CA, UDF, DSB, and BPU held twenty-one, twenty,
seventeen, and thirteen of the remaining seats, respectively (PARLINE Database 2014).
The coalition government preceding 2005 represented pro-European platforms and the
desire to improve the country’s economy. Led by former King Simeon II, NMSS, which held the
majority of seats in parliament (one hundred and twenty seats), pledged to bring the country’s
economy up to par with the standards of the EU and made it a goal to work towards membership
in the organization. As in 2005, the CB in 2001 shared majority power with NMSS, however,
was the second largest coalition in Bulgaria’s parliament with forty-eight seats. Bulgaria’s 2005
National Assembly demonstrated a slight shift in power with CB gaining twenty-nine more seats
than NMSS while the two remained in power. Both coalitions, however, in 2001 and 2005
demonstrated support for both EU and NATO accession (PARLINE Database 2014).
In 2005, the political parties of the Bulgarian government became very fragmented. With
conflicting ideologies between the major parties, the process of creating a coalition government
after the election was long and complicated. The BSP and the Movement for Rights and
Freedoms (MRF) attempted to form a coalition but fell short five seats of the minimum
requirement of one hundred and twenty-one seats needed to appoint a coalition and maintain a
stable governing parliament (Ganev 2006). In order to make progress in forming a coalition
government, the BSP and the MRF were forced to include NMSS (a party that was staunchly in
opposition to the platforms of the BSP and MRF) in the coalition. The cause of conflict between
NMSS and the other two parties stemmed from the NMSS believing that the BSP and MRF were
fiscally irresponsible and politically incompetent, and a threat to the future integration of
Bulgaria in the EU (Ganev 2006). Carothers (2002) argues that in weak democracies political
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elites are perceived as corrupt and self-interested. The public for this reason believed that the
sudden cooperation of the three political parties was the result of corruption in government and
political figures working to secure what was in their interest (Ganev 2006). The reasons why
these parties ultimately cooperated have not been concluded.
The 2009 parliamentary election resulted in NMSS—renamed the National Movement
for Stability and Progress (NMSP) in 2008—losing representation in parliament and the centerright party, the Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria Party (GERB), gaining the most
seats in parliament. The newly formed political party GERB maintained popularity mostly
through its charismatic leader, Boiko Borisov (Ghodsee 2008). Between the 2005 and 2009
National Assembly elections many changes in Bulgaria’s government took place; new electoral
laws were drafted and implemented and in 2007, and Bulgaria gained membership in the EU.
The economic crisis along with the newly developed relationship between the country and the
supranational organization led to new coalitions and political parties taking the fore in the 2009
political race. GERB, the ATAKA party, the Blue Coalition (BC), and the Order Lawfulness
Justice Party (RZS), along with the CB and DPS took the seats of parliament (one hundred and
sixteen, twenty-one, fifteen, ten, forty, and thirty-eight seats, respectively), throwing out NMSP,
CA, UDF, DSB, and BPU.
With the newly formed parliament, came current political and economic issues to
address. Although the goal of membership in the EU had been met, fiscal growth as a matter of
contention remained. Corruption in government became an issue after the ECB froze over five
hundred million euros in 2008, an aid allotment that was intended for growth in agriculture and
infrastructure (PARLINE Database 2014). The ECB believed that the Bulgarian government was
not addressing issues of corruption and organized crime sufficiently and therefore used monetary
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sanctions to punish the country. GERB and the BC, both center-right in political platforms,
campaigned on economic growth and accountability with the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and pledged to fight corruption in the government and economy. The CB on the other hand,
which still maintained forty seats in parliament after the 2009 election, argued that GERB and
the BC would threaten Bulgarian citizens’ social protection in their efforts to legitimize the
economy through energy and healthcare privatization (PARLINE Database 2014). Overall, the
main coalition forces in the 2009 National Assembly continued with pro-European platforms and
goals. However, their methods of attaining these goals conflicted.

Czech Republic
As in all of the post-Soviet countries in the sample, the Czech Republic experienced
single party rule prior to the transition following 1989. The Communist Party (KSČ) controlled
the National Front (NF) and it was not until a group of anti-communist human rights activists
launched the Civic Forum (OF) in late 1989, that the Communist Party experienced contestation
(Czech Republic 2005). During the early 1990s two movements developed out of the OF, the
Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and the Civic Movement (ČSNS). In ensuing years, ODS
maintained high levels (if not majority) representation in both chambers. The bicameral structure
of the Czech Republic’s parliament developed out of the need for a division of powers among
legislative bodies and regional representation (Kysela 2014).
The Chamber of Deputies is comprised of fourteen multi-member constituencies that
maintain two hundred seats in the house. Members of parliament are directly elected by Czech
citizens in a proportional representation system where single parties must gain five percent of the
vote for representation, coalitions of two parties must win ten percent of the vote, three parties,
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fifteen percent of the vote, and four or more parties must receive twenty percent of the vote to
maintain representation in the Lower House (PARLINE Database 2014). During the 2006
parliamentary elections, five political parties gained representation in the Chamber of Deputies;
ODS won eighty-one seats (35.38 percent of the vote), the Czech Social Democratic Party
(ČSSD) won seventy-four seats (32.32 percent), the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia
(KSČM) won twenty-six seats (12.81 percent), the Christian Democratic Union-Czech People’s
Party (KDU-ČSL) won thirteen seats (7.23 percent), and lastly, the Green Party (SZ) won six
seats (3 percent) (PARLINE Database 2014). Overall, the sentiments of the majority parties in
power were pro-EU. However, there were hesitations from the coalition developed by the ODS,
the KDU-ČSL, and the SZ, to adopt the euro as national currency following the country’s
accession to the EU. The coalition formed by the ČSSD and the KSČM was also pro-EU but in
response to adopting the euro as national currency, the coalition not only supported its
implementation but also aimed at accomplishing that goal by 2010.
While the two coalitions had similar feelings towards membership in the EU, issues
regarding the euro caused significant problems when the Lower House experienced political
deadlock after the 2006 elections (Haughton, Novotná, and Deegan-Krause 2011). Both
coalitions held one hundred of the two hundred seats in the Chamber of Deputies, therefore
making it very difficult for the governmental body to gain any headway in economic issues such
as the adoption of the euro or the implementation of a value added tax (VAT) (PARLINE
Database 2014). In order to resolve this issue, the Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek attempted to
create a government led by the ODS as a single player (not a part of a coalition) but failed to win
the parliamentary vote of confidence which led to months of negotiations and ultimately the
formation of a new coalition government (PARLINE database 2014). In 2007, the ODS, KDU-
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ČSL, and SZ formed a center-right coalition and gained majority representation in the Chamber
of Deputies (Haughton, Novotná, and Deegan-Krause 2011).
The Senate, on the other hand, is developed from eighty-one single member
constituencies that are directly elected by Czech citizens with voting eligibility. The ODS (fortyone seats), the ČSSD (twelve seats), and the KDU-ČSL (ten seats) had the most members with
representation in the 2006 upper house of parliament. Thirteen other political parties held seats in
the Senate but were only represented by, in most cases one to three people. The make-up of the
2008 upper house was similar to 2006 with the ODS holding the most seats (thirty-five), the
ČSSD coming in second with twenty-nine seats, and the KDU-ČSL with seven seats. Party
power in both houses and for both years in observation for Senate were similar in ideologies and
goals regarding a relationship with the EU.

Estonia
Two parliamentary elections taking place in 2003 and 2007 will be discussed for Estonia.
The structure of parliament in Estonia is unicameral in nature. The chamber is elected every four
years by direct election from which one hundred and one seats are filled. Coalition governments
formed following both elections and developed unique platforms focused on EU and NATO
membership as well as crime, corruption, and unemployment during the 2003 election, and
economic growth, and tax and welfare reform in 2007 (PARLINE Database 2014).
The 2003 Riigikogu (Estonian parliamentary chamber) election resulted in two centerright parties obtaining sixty seats in parliament; the remaining forty-one seats were occupied by
parties of center-left ideologies. The Center Party and Res Publica (RP) both won twenty-eight
seats which resulted in political deadlock in the chamber. The former party led by Edgar Savisaar
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remained suspicious of free-market economic policies and Estonia’s accession to the EU, while
the latter supported capitalist economic policies and promoted membership in the Union
(Taagepera 2006). With political deadlock and conflicting platforms on the two most important
issues of the 2003 parliamentary elections, progress in the policy-making process came to a
staunch halt in the Riigikogu. In order to alleviate the issue, the leader of RP, Mr. Juhan Parts
established a coalition between his party, the Reform Party, and the Estonian People’s Union
(Pettai 2004). However, after his resignation in 2005, a new coalition developed between the
Reform Party, the Center Party, and the Estonian People’s Union leading to a shift in political
power and dominant ideologies in Estonia.
Two coalitions maintained power during the years falling within this analysis. The first,
which led the government from 2003 until 2007 was comprised of RP, the Estonian Reform
Party (RE), and the People’s Union of Estonia (ERL). RP began in 1989 when a group of young
anti-Soviet activists banded together to enact political change. It did not officially become a
party until 2001 and was rightist in nature, appealing to the portion of the citizenry that was
unable to identify, or was dissatisfied, with center and center-left political power (Estonia 2005).
The coalition was led by Juhan Parts—Estonia’s prime minister from April of 2003 until April of
2005—a member of Res Publica. The three parties shared economic ideologies regarding
international issues of EU and NATO membership, and domestic issues as regards
unemployment rates, economic growth, and a flat tax.
In 2006, RP dropped out of government giving way to a new coalition government led by
Edgar Savisaar of the Estonian People’s Center Party (EK), which included the Estonian Rural
People’s Party (EME). A shift from the center-right position of the 2003 coalition government to
the center-left in 2006 of the opposition party was a drastic change for the Estonian public. The
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new center-left government’s tenure did not last long, however, and in 2007 the RE gained
power in parliament. The Estonian parliament returned to a rightist position in 2007 and
remained there until the ensuing election of 2011.

Hungary
During the late 1980s prior to the transition from communism, the Hungarian Socialist
Workers’ Party (MSzMP) was the only political party authorized to participate in government.
Following the transition in 1989, the Hungarian National Assembly (Orszaggyules) authorized
other independent parties to engage in the campaigning and election process for parliament
(Hungary 2005). Since the mid-1990s, hundreds of political parties have registered and
participated in Orszaggyules elections. However, the Hungarian political system today is
resistant to the entry of new parties—it is highly polarized and competitive (Enyedi 2006).
The 2006 Orszaggyules elections resulted in a socialist coalition gaining power and
Katalin Szili—the leader of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP)—becoming speaker of the
Orszaggyules. The MSzP and the Alliance of Free Democrats (SzDSz) in 2006 established a
coalition that ultimately faced the conservative coalition comprised of the Hungarian Civic
Union-Christian Democratic People’s Party (FIDESz) and the Christian Democratic Party
(KDNP) in the election; these two “hegemonic camps” dominated the Hungarian parliament in
2006 (Palonen 2009). Regarding the distribution of seats, the former coalition secured two
hundred and ten of three hundred and eighty-six seats winning majority status in parliament, and
the opposition party, FIDESz led by Viktor Orbán in 2006, secured one hundred and sixty-four
of the three hundred and eighty-six seats available in the National Assembly. The two coalitions,
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conflicting in ideology—but, never in a stalemate due to MSzP-SzDSz’s significant seat gain on
FIDESz in the 2006 election—secured seats of almost the entire assembly.
Multiple economic issues arose during the election. The main issue however, was the
adoption of the euro as national currency. While Hungary has yet to become a member of the
Eurozone (due to high deficits), the country has continued to make headway towards approval
from the EU regarding the adoption of the euro (PARLINE Database 2014). The 2008 economic
crisis, however, caused a setback in Hungary’s ability to meet the standards of the EU by causing
a 7.7 percent decrease in GDP growth (from 0.9 to -6.8 percent growth). Also, the national
deficit as a percent of GDP lessened from -8.6 in 2006 (the year of the assembly election) to -3.8
in 2008 (World Bank 2014). Hungary’s economy during these three years experienced declining
deficits, however, in 2009 deficits increased again to -4.1 percent of GDP indicating a weakening
economy (World Bank 2014). While four years have passed since Hungary has experienced
deficits, the forint (Hungary’s national currency) has not yet met the standard of the Exchange
Rate Mechanism (ERM II)—a mechanism designed to ensure that exchange rates between the
euro and the national currency of a member state do not disrupt economic stability in the single
market that is the Eurozone—established by the EU (European Commission 2013).
Regarding economic policies, the two coalitions agreed with growth, but disagreed with
the means to accomplish it. The MSzP-SzDSz coalition supported foreign investment, the
promotion of a free-market economy, and enhancing relations between private and public
business sectors in order to bolster economic growth (Korkut 2007). The FIDESz, on the other
hand, believed that foreign investment would threaten national industry and that it should be kept
to a minimum instead of relying on it for development (PARLINE Database 2014). Despite these
disagreements, both parties agreed that the state should play a central role in economic reforms
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and advancement. The role of outside actors such as other member states of the EU and the EMU
was not clearly agreed upon. Ultimately, the pro-EU (MSzP-SzDSz) coalition remained in power
after the election.

Latvia
In August of 1991, Latvia gained independence from the former Soviet Bloc. The
country’s first parliamentary elections took place on June fifth and sixth of 1993, wherein eight
hundred and seventy-nine candidates participated representing twenty-three political parties
(Latvia 1993). Since the first election, five more have taken place. For the purpose of this study,
the 2010 parliamentary election will not be discussed—having taken place in October of 2010,
the results will not have affected the Eurobarometer public opinion survey conducted during the
spring of that year. However, the 2006 election will determine the party power of parliament for
the five years of this study.
The Latvian parliament consists of one hundred members who are elected directly every
four years by popular vote using a party list system for five multi-member constituencies
(PARLINE Database 2014). Between the 2002 and 2006 elections, three coalition governments
formed in parliament headed by center-right parties. The first conservative government that took
power was led by the New Era Party (JL) and included the Union of Greens and Farmers (ZZS),
the Latvia’s First Party (LPP), and the Conservative Union for Fatherland and Freedom
(TB/LNNK) (PARLINE Database 2014). The JL, a liberal-right party, upon its establishment in
2002, developed a platform on economic growth and stability, anti-corruption measures, and
accession to the EU and NATO. The other members of the coalition were concerned with the
same issues, namely EU and NATO membership and economic growth (Latvia 2005).
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In 2004, when the JL withdrew from the coalition due to a vote-buying scandal including
the LPP, a new center-right coalition government formed including the LPP, the ZZS and the
People’s Party (TP) (PARLINE DATABASE 2014). The TP, new to the coalition, and also
center-right in ideology, established a platform on the development of privately owned
businesses, and pro-membership in the EU, NATO, and the World Trade Organization (WTO)
(Latvia 2005). The coalition did not last long, and in 2005 the Prime Minister, Indulis Emsis of
the ZZS, resigned when his budget proposals were rejected by parliament (PARLINE Database
2014). The final coalition to precede the 2006 election was comprised of the same three parties
but was led by the new Prime Minister, Aigars Kalvitis. Political parties that were pro-Russian
and leftist in ideology were represented in parliament but did not participate in any of the
coalition governments and only maintained a quarter of the seats in parliament.
Nineteen political parties and a total of 1,024 candidates participated in the 2006
parliamentary election. Two electoral coalitions formed representing conflicting ideologies. The
first built on a platform pledging to promote economic stability and an enhanced relationship
with the EU was developed by the LPP and the Latvian Way Party (LC). The second represented
the Russian minority in Latvia and maintained a leftist ideology; the parties active in this
coalition were the For Civil Rights Party (PCTVL) and the Concord Center (SC). Another rival
to the center-right coalition was the JL. The 2006 election was the first to take place since the
country’s accession to the EU in 2004 which can account for the rise in Russian minority
representation in 2006. Following the election, former Prime Minister Emsis as newly elected
Speaker, formed a government where the TP, the ZZS, the LPP-LC, and the TB/LNNK formed a
coalition and controlled fifty-nine seats in parliament. This newly formed coalition was
representative of the outgoing government and introduced the LC and the TB/LNNK, both of
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which are established on conservative, center-right ideologies. The two new parties to join the
coalition held pro-EU and pro-NATO positions despite the fact that the latter party (TB/LNNK)
was nationalistic in nature and wanted to establish purity (in language, strict citizenry laws, and
culture) in the Latvian citizenry (Latvia 2005).
Between the 2006 and 2010 elections, Prime Minister Kalvitis resigned and Ivars
Godmanis took the position of Prime Minister in 2007. He only held the position for two years
when in 2009, following the global economic crisis, he resigned and Valdis Dombrovskis took
the position. The collapsing Latvian economy is what ultimately led to riots consuming the
capital and Godmanis’ resignation (Marksoo, Białasiewicz, and Best 2010). Latvia was one of
the three countries (the other two being Estonia and Lithuania) that was the most negatively
affected by the economic crisis—unemployment rates soared and GDP growth plummeted
significantly in general, and in comparison to the other countries in the sample. Prime Minister
Dombrovskis in 2009 led a minority government comprised of the JL, the ZZS, and the
TB/LNNK. The overall atmosphere of government remained center-right in ideology and
continued to support membership in the EU after receiving a significant amount of aid from the
institution following the economic crisis (PARLINE Database 2014).

Lithuania
The final Baltic state to be examined is Lithuania. Compared to Estonia and Latvia,
Lithuania in both the 2004 and 2008 parliamentary elections maintained a government controlled
by center-left political parties. The 2004 government led by Prime Minister Algirdas Brazauskas,
was represented by a coalition comprised of the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (LSDP), the
Social Liberal Party (SLP), the Labor Party (DP), the Union of Farmers’ Party, and the New
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Democracy Party (PARLINE Database 2014). Both the LSDP and the SLP developed on a
platform to increase average salaries and ensure retirement pensions for the public. While the
LSDP falls traditionally on the left of the ideological spectrum, the party supports liberal
democracy, free-market economic policies, and social activism (Jurkynas 2005). On the other
hand, the leader of the DP (which gained the most seats in parliament during the 2004 election),
Viktor Uspaskich, had strong ties to Russia which concerned parties on the conservative side of
the spectrum. The center-right Homeland Union argued that in order to protect Lithuania against
threats from Russia, the country needed to establish a strong independent state. Other
conservative parties, such as the Liberal and Center Union (LCS)—which consisted of the
Lithuanian Liberal Union (LLS), the Lithuanian Center Union (LCS), and the Modern Christian
Democratic Union (MKDS)—shared the same fears (Jurkynas 2005).
In 2008, Andrius Kubilius, leader of the Homeland Union-Lithuanian Christian
Democrats (TS-LKD), formed a coalition government consisting of his party, the Rising Nation
Party (RNP), the Liberals Movement of the Republic of Lithuania, and the Liberal and Center
Union (PARLINE Database 2014). Two of the member parties of the coalition were newly
formed in 2008, the TS-LKD and the RNP. The TS-LKD, a merger party of the former
Homeland Union and the Lithuanian Christian Democrats classified itself as a right-of-center
political party yet was open to candidates with communist ideologies (Lithuania 2005). The
election resulted in the TS-LKD winning the most seats with forty-five of the one hundred and
forty-one seats in parliament secured; the RNP won sixteen seats; the Liberals Movement of the
Republic of Lithuania won eleven seats; and the Liberal and Center Union won eight seats. All in
all, the governing coalition held eighty of the one hundred and forty-one seats in parliament
(PARLINE Database 2014).
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Poland
The Polish parliament is bicameral and consists of the Sejm, the lower house, and the
Senate, the upper house. The former consists of four hundred and sixty directly elected members
and the latter of one hundred directly elected representatives. Term limits for each house are four
years. However, if a government is to dissolve, elections can take place in the midterm; this was
experienced in 2007 when the coalition government led by Jaroslaw Kaczynski of the
conservative Law and Justice Party (PiS) collapsed on allegations of corruption and the leaking
of classified information (PARLINE Database 2014). Two Polish parliamentary elections will be
examined in this analysis, one taking place in 2005, and the other in 2007.
In 2005, an election took place after the normal term expiration for both the Sejm and the
Senate. The election resulted in a one party minority government formed by the prime minister
and leader of the PiS, Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz. The PiS and the Civic Platform (PO)
maintained a majority in the Sejm with one hundred and fifty-five and one hundred and thirtythree seats, respectively, and in the Senate with forty-nine and thirty-four seats, respectively
(PARLINE Database 2014). Both of these parties, center-right and conservative in ideology,
built platforms on deregulation, privatization, the adoption of the euro, and tax breaks. Also, with
plans to form a coalition, the parties focused on fighting corruption in government and
establishing transparency of government actions for the public (Markowski 2006).
Since the first election following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, center-left parties
maintained control in the Polish parliament. The 2005 election was the first to take place where
the left experienced significant losses. As a result of the 2001 election, a left-wing coalition
government led by the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the Labor Union (UP) maintained a
majority in parliament. The coalition held two hundred and sixteen seats in the Sejm, and
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seventy-five in the Senate; it was later joined by the Polish Peasant Party which held forty-two
seats in the Sejm, and four in the Senate. All of these parties were leftist in nature and leaned
towards prior communist ideologies.
After Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004, the unemployment rate was higher in the
country compared to any other member state (PARLINE Database 2014). Despite increases in
foreign investment following accession, the country’s baby boom of the early 1980s caused
unemployment rates to continue to soar (PARLINE Database 2014). The PiS and the PO both
pledged to address economic issues and high rates of unemployment in the 2005 and 2007
elections.
The premature parliamentary election of 2007 resulted in the PO and the PiS maintaining
the majority in both houses. However, the PO rose above the PiS in the number of seats held in
both the Sejm and the Senate. The former won two hundred and nine seats in the lower house
and sixty seats in the upper while the latter won one hundred and sixty-six and thirty-nine seats,
respectively. The two parties faced opposition during the election from the SLD which formed
an electoral coalition with the Social Democracy of Poland (SDPL), the Democratic Party (PD),
and the UP. The coalition criticized the 2005 PiS-led government claiming that a radical
reduction in taxation would ultimately lead to the country’s economy collapsing (PARLINE
Database 2014). The Left and Democrats coalition (LiD), comprised of the four parties listed
above, won fifty-three seats in the Sejm and no seats in the Senate. The only parties represented
in the Senate resulting from the 2007 election were the PO and the PiS (Szczerbiak 2008).
Through the 2008 economic crisis, the Polish government was run by center-right
political parties with strong conservative ideologies. They promoted the free-market economy
and business privatization for economic growth. Reduced taxation was another element of their
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economic policies and privatization of state-owned companies was a goal of the coalition. The
desire to adopt the euro as soon as possible following the 2007 election has yet to be
accomplished. The Polish zloty is still used as national currency as the country attempts to
develop its economy and meet the standards of the EU.

Romania
Romania, one of the two newest member states to the EU (the other being Bulgaria), held
parliamentary elections in 2004 and 2008, both of which are relevant to this study. The bicameral
parliament consisting of the upper house, the Senate, and the lower house, the Chamber of
Deputies, holds elections every four years at the expiry of each member’s term. The two
elections in observation took place three years prior to the country’s accession to the EU, and a
year after gaining membership and the onset of the global financial crisis. Elections held in 2008
occurred after the country had begun to feel the effects of the declining economy. Therefore,
political party power resulting from this election should indicate the national government’s
response to the economic downturn and relationships with the EU.
In 2004, three political alliances led the Romanian parliamentary elections. The Social
Democratic Party (PSD) in alliance with the Humanist Party (PUR) ran in first place; the Justice
and Truth alliance (ADA) consisting of the center-left Democrat Party and the center-right
National Liberal Party followed; and the Greater Romania Party (PRM) came in third to the
other alliances (PARLINE Database 2014). Many of the political parties running in the election
agreed on key economic issues such as EU membership, the introduction of a flat sixteen percent
tax, and the adoption of the euro by 2014. Namely, the PSD and the ADA promoted Romania
joining the EU and fostering economic growth (Stan 2005). When accession occurred in 2007,
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the country’s economy boomed and the inflation rate dropped seven percentage points, the GDP
growth rate rose above 8 percent upon the implementation of the flat tax, and remittances of
about two million Romanians working abroad accounted for about 8.95 billion U.S. dollars
(USD) in 2007 (PARLINE Database 2014). Romania did not experience economic success for
long when the 2008 economic crisis initiated a downturn in economic growth.
The election of 2004 resulted in the PSD-PUR alliance gaining the most seats in the
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate (one hundred and thirty-two and fifty-seven seats,
respectively). The ADA followed with one hundred and twelve seats in the Chamber of Deputies
and forty-nine in the Senate; the Greater Romania Party (PRM) won forty-eight seats in the
lower house and twenty-one in the upper house; and the Hungarian Democratic Union of
Romania (UDMR) won twenty-two and ten seats, respectively. Center-left and center-right
parties were both apparent in the governing parties of parliament. Foreign issues were mostly
agreed upon (such as pro-EU membership), while domestic issues (the implementation of a flat
tax, pension grants, and increased teachers’ pay) caused conflict between the left and right.
A shift in party power took place in 2008, once the country began to feel the immediate
effects of the global economic crisis. Free-market economic policies were still supported by the
president, Traian Basescu, and the prime minister, Calin Popescu-Tariceanu upon accession to
the EU and the onset of the economic crisis. However, new party power in parliament began to
emerge. The Democratic Liberal Party (PD-L), the PSD-Conservative Party (PC) alliance, and
the PNL were the main challengers in the election, with the PRM, and the UDMR losing power
in parliament. The reformed electoral rules—which changed voting for a list to voting for a
specific candidate—caused the PRM and the UDMR to lose representation in parliament, an
issue that both parties anticipated upon the implementation of the new laws (Marian and King
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2010). The results were as follows: the PD-L won one hundred and fifteen seats in the Chamber
of Deputies and fifty-one seats in the Senate; the PSD-PC alliance won one hundred and fourteen
and forty-nine seats, respectively; the PNL won sixty-five and twenty-eight seats, respectively;
and the UDMR won twenty-two and nine seats, respectively (PARLINE Database 2014). A
coalition government formed between the PD-L and the PSD under the leadership of Emil Boc,
the leader of the PD-L. The parties gaining power after the 2008 election were all center-right in
political orientation. All continued to support free-market reform and the adoption of the euro to
strengthen the national economy. The leu (Romania’s national currency) continues to be used
today, however, the country still has plans and is working towards the adoption of the euro.

Slovakia
The Slovak Republic—of former Czechoslovakia—gained independence from the union
with the Czech Republic in January of 1993. Prior to 1989, the Communist Party controlled the
government in Czechoslovakia. The National Front of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
(ČSR) (controlled by the Communist Party) limited the ability of other political parties to gain
representation in government. Immediately following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the
Velvet Revolution (which restored democracy in Czechoslovakia in 1989), opposition parties in
government began to surface. The Civic Forum (OF), the Public against Violence (VPN), and the
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) all began to form coalitions and minority factions
in government during the early 1990s (Slovakia 2005).
The HZDS, after the two republics gained independence from each other, became the
largest and most popular party in the Slovak Republic—it stood for returning to a democratic
Slovakia that once existed prior to communist rule. Rather than take a strong stance on political
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issues upon its formation in the early 1990s, the HZDS built a platform on being inclusive and
constructive (Haughton 2001). The position of the HZDS on the ideological spectrum has never
been clear which is perhaps why the party experienced such success during the 1990s and early
2000s. By enforcing the rule and ideologies of its leader, the party was able to mold to the times
and address various issues with the main goal in mind which was always democratic growth and
accountability in the country (Haughton 2001). In 2006, the party formed an alliance with the
People’s Party and gained fifteen seats in parliament, however, remained the minority party of
the National Council.
Prior to the 2006 elections for the National Council—the single body of the unicameral
parliament in Slovakia—the overall political atmosphere was center-right and conservative in
nature. The four party coalition government resulting from the 2002 election was controlled by
the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU), the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK), the
Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), and the Alliance of New Citizens (ANO). Despite the
economy prospering in terms of GDP growth and increased FDI in 2005, public opinion began to
shift away from the center-right government due to the unemployment rate remaining high at 15
percent (PARLINE Database 2014). Salient economic issues such as high unemployment gave
way to a new leftist political party taking the fore in the 2006 election. The Smer Party, pledged
to increase social spending and discontinue the VAT introduced in 2004, and the 19 percent flat
rate income tax. This garnered a positive response from the public and Smer ended up securing
fifty of the one hundred and fifty seats in parliament that are directly elected by the citizenry
(Haughton, Novotná, and Deegan-Krause 2011).
Five other parties gained representation in parliament, including those that are centerright on the ideological spectrum. The SDKU maintained thirty-one seats, the SMK, twenty
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seats, the People’s Party-Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (LS-HZDS), fifteen seats, and the
KDH, fourteen seats. The Slovak National Party (SNS), which had not gained representation in
the 2002 parliament won twenty seats during the 2006 election. The party, far right in nature,
pledged to keep the SMK out of government. However, both parties gained the same amount of
representation and remained at odds in the legislative processes to ensue (PARLINE Database
2014).
The primary issues of the 2006 election were mainly domestic, focusing on government
spending, taxation laws, and unemployment. Nevertheless, international issues remained
important—in 2004 the government of Slovakia enforced austerity measures in order to reduce
deficits and meet the standards of the EU (Slovakia 2005). The main parties of the 2006 election
were also concerned with the implementation of economic reforms necessary to adopt the euro as
national currency and to expand the economy. Having already gained membership in the EU in
2004, the crucial interests of the government rested in domestic economic growth.

Slovenia
Since 1989, Slovenia has experienced the structuring and restructuring of numerous
political parties and coalitions in government. Prior to 1989, like many of the other countries in
the sample, the only political party that exercised any influence in government was the
Communist Party—in Slovenia, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ). In 1990,
however, the SKJ approved a multi-party system and many began to arise. The Democratic
Opposition of Slovenia (Demos), an alliance comprised of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDS),
the Slovenian Christian Democrats (SKD), the Slovenian Peasant League (SKZ), the Slovenian
Democratic League (SDZ), the Social Democratic League of Slovenia (SDZS), and the Greens
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of Slovenia (ZS) established the first opposition to the SKJ. A plethora of democratic parties,
both right and left of center, have developed platforms in the Slovenian government.
During the 1990s center-right coalitions, that supported a transition to a free-market
economy and accession to the EU and NATO, maintained power in government. From the early
1990s until the election of 2004, the LDS dominated the political arena with the promotion of
center-right political ideologies. The 2004 election changed party power in government with the
Democratic Party (SDS) gaining leadership and forming a coalition with the New Slovenia
(NSi), the Democratic Pensioners Party (DeSUS), and the Slovenian People’s Party-Slovenian
Christian Democrats (SLS-SKD). Of the four parties that were members of the new coalition
government, two (DeSUS and SLS-SKD), identified as left-of-center. With the shifting nature of
party membership and coalitions in Slovenia, political ideologies have not always been wellgrounded in government and on issues. Overall, the parties in the coalition agreed on many of the
most important areas such as EU membership, economic growth, and a liberalized market
(Slovenia 2005).
The 2004 National Assembly election resulted in the SDS gaining the most seats (twentynine out of ninety that are directly elected), the LDS coming in second with twenty-three seats,
the ZLSD with ten seats, the NSi won nine, the SLS won seven, the SNS won six, DeSUS won
four, and there were two representatives of ethnic minorities elected. The SDS, NSi, DeSUS, and
the SLS-SKD formed a center-right coalition taking a majority of seats in parliament (forty-nine
of ninety seats). The economic issues focused on by the coalition were deregulation,
privatization, and a market-economy (Slovenia 2005). The 2008 election yielded different
results. The Social Democrats (SD) won the most seats in parliament coming ahead of the SDS
with one seat (the former won twenty-nine seats, and the latter, twenty-eight). For the Real-New
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Politics (ZARES) party, established by members of the LDS in 2007, won nine seats in the
National Assembly. With the growth in popularity of the center-right political parties in 2004,
LDS a leftist party experienced a slow disintegration with many members leaving to join other
parties and alliances (Adam, Kristan, and Tomšič 2009).
The main issues of the 2008 election were taxes, housing, and border control with
Croatia. In 2007, Slovenia adopted the euro causing economic growth of 5.5 percent. While
many other countries in the sample continued to deal with struggling economies, those in the
Eurozone benefited from stability in currencies and exchange rates. Despite this economic
success, in 2008, at the onset of the economic crisis, the inflation rate began to climb reaching
the highest it had been in six years (PARLINE Database 2014). Notwithstanding, the main focus
during the election was less on international economic issues and more so on domestic issues to
promote further growth and combat increasing inflation rates. The SD during the 2008 election
criticized the SDS for failing to address inflation—the party promised to introduce tax relief for
lower income individuals in order to alleviate economic pressures at the individual level. The
resulting coalition government of the 2008 election ensured that SD maintained control, despite
SDS coming in second with 29.26 percent of the vote (PARLINE Database 2014).

National Level Party Power in Cyprus and Malta
The two cases of Cyprus and Malta, which are included in the ordered logistic analysis,
differ in many ways from the ten other post-Soviet sample countries. As former British colonies,
Cyprus and Malta did not transition politically nor economically as the other countries in the
sample did during the late 1980s after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, neither
country gained independence from the British Empire until the 1960s (Cyprus in 1960, and
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Malta in 1964) and have a relatively short history of an independent government. Comparatively
speaking, in this sample, these two countries were more Western and democratic upon gaining
accession to the EU in 2004. As two of the newest member states to the institution, it is
important to consider them in this analysis for one important reason—they provide a
comparative perspective to the communist legacy from the Great Russian super-power.

Cyprus
One parliamentary election was held in Cyprus during the five model years. In 2006,
eighty seats were open for direct election by the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities for a
five year term. Having already gained membership in the EU, the main issue of the election was
the reunification of the country. The Greek community (75.8 percent), which held fifty-six of the
eighty seats in parliament rejected the reunification plan, while the Turkish community (64.9
percent) supported it in 2004 (PARLINE Database 2014). Prior to the 2006 election, the Turkish
minority was absent in the institutions of central government; however, during this election one
Turkish candidate ran but did not secure a seat in parliament. Therefore, it is important to note
that about eighteen percent of the population were unrepresented in government during the years
in analysis.
In 2001, prior to gaining membership in the EU, the Communist Progressive Party of the
Working People (AKEL) won twenty of the fifty-six seats allotted to Greek representatives and
formed a coalition government with the centrist Democratic Party (DIKO), which won nine
seats. The democratic opposition party on the right, the Democratic Rally (DISY), won nineteen
seats but was far outnumbered by the leftist parties in government. AKEL and DIKO during the
early 1990s were opposed to EU membership but did not build a strong platform on the issue. In
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1995, AKEL changed positions on European integration and began to see it as a positive factor
that could help to combat the security issue between the Greek and Turkish communities.
However, strong sentiments and political platforms were still not developed on the issue.
Compared to the post-Soviet member states, membership in the institution lacked the political
drive and importance in Cyprus during the 2004 accession and the 2006 parliamentary elections.
In 2004, Cyprus was the strongest country economically to gain membership in the EU
(Katsourides 2003). Four years after accession, in 2008, the country adopted the euro as national
currency and became a member of the Eurozone. Unemployment rates in the five model years
remained low (in comparison to the other sample countries), and the GDP annual growth rate
was steady and only dipped slightly (-1.7 percent in 2009) after the onset of the economic crisis.
Membership in the EU as an issue did not hold the same weight in economic gains (or losses) in
Cyprus as it did in the other member states. This is not to say that various groups in the Cypriot
community did not hold opinions on membership, they were just not as clearly established in the
political realm and party platforms (Katsourides 2003).
The 2006 parliamentary election resulted in AKEL and DISY gaining the most seats
(both parties won eighteen seats in parliament). DIKO, a coalition member of AKEL won eleven
seats and the two parties together remained in power. Other members of the AKEL/ DIKO
coalition were the Movement of Social Democrats (EDEK), the European Party (EK), and the
Ecologists-Environmentalists Movement. The only right opposition party to the coalition
government was DISY. Reunification plans remained important and the country worked with the
United Nations to enforce political cohesion between the two ethnic communities.
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Malta
Malta, like Cyprus, was a former British colony that gained independence in 1964. With
a history of democratic rule and free-market economic policies, Malta had an advantage
economically, compared to the other countries in the sample (save Cyprus) prior to and after
accession to the EU. The difference between Malta and Cyprus, is that an ethnic divide is not
apparent in the country. In Cyprus, one portion of the community desired unification, while the
other desired independence and opposed membership in a unified country and supranational
organization. Because such ethnic tensions did not occupy the political landscape in Malta during
the two parliamentary elections taking place in 2003 and 2008, the focus could remain on
membership in the EU. Political party power in the country from 2006 until 2010 will be
determined through the examination of the two elections previously referenced.
The political structure in Malta is unicameral in nature. The House of Representatives is
comprised of sixty-five seats, all of which are directly elected by the citizenry (PARLINE
Database 2014). While a multi-party system is in place, two political parties maintain power of
parliament. The Nationalist Party (PN), and the Labor Party (MLP), in 2003 and 2008, won all of
the seats in parliament with the PN in both elections maintaining power by an acute margin. In
2003, the PN developed a platform that was congruent with the EU’s social and economic
policies and ultimately won 51.8 percent of the vote and thirty-five seats in the House of
Representatives. On the other hand, the MLP campaigned on economic issues that were more
focused domestic policies such as taxation laws (PARLINE Database 2014). With the PN
maintaining power in both elections, a pro-EU platform was seemingly more popular across the
citizenry. The MLP held a neutral position on foreign policy in both elections, however, prior to
accession the party was opposed to membership in the EU (Malta 2005).
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In 2008, Malta adopted the euro as national currency and became a member in the
Eurozone (PARLINE Database 2014). The two political parties campaigned on economic
policies during the 2008 election but remained at odds on foreign policies. Both parties
advocated for job creation, and a boost in GDP annual growth rates. However, the means to
accomplish these goals differed between the two parties. The PN campaigned on its past
achievements with power in parliament—the party had created 20,000 new jobs and reduced the
public deficit from 10 percent in 2004 to 1.6 percent in 2007. The leverage that the party used
during the 2008 election was the promise to lower the flat income tax from 35 to 30 percent
(PARLINE Database 2014). On the other side, the MLP promised to create 2,000 jobs in
industry and 4,000 in new technologies while boosting GDP growth to over four percent
(PARLINE Database 2014). Like Cyprus, the economy in Malta was not as heavily impacted by
the economic crisis as the other ten countries in the sample. The main focus of political parties
during the elections held in the model years remained on domestic growth through means
independent of the EU.
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Table 3. Political Party Power in Parliament by Year and Position
Left
Center
Bulgaria
2006-2008 (BSP)
Cyprus
2006-2010 (DIKO)
Czech Republic
Estonia
2006 (EK)
Hungary
2008-2010 (MSzP)
2006-2007 (MSzPSzDSz)
Latvia
Lithuania
Malta
Poland

2006-2007 (DP)

Romania
2006-2007 (PSD-PUR)
Slovakia
2006-2010 (Smer)
Slovenia
2008-2010 (SD)
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2013

Right
2009-2010 (GERB)
2006-2010 (ODS)
2007-2010 (RE)

2006-2008 (TP)
2009-2010 (JL)
2008-2010 (TS-LKD)
2006-2010 (PN)
2006 (PiS)
2007-2010 (PO)
2008-2010 (PD-L)
2006-2007 (SDS)

Hypotheses
Multiple variables affect public attitudes towards membership in the EU. The
relationships between opinion on membership in the EU and the economic voting hypothesis,
political party influence, age, identity, individual-level political ideology, and economic
winner/loser status will be hypothesized in this section.

Aggregate-Level Hypotheses
Three economic indicators—unemployment rates, Eurozone member status, and GDP
annual growth rates—and political party influence will be discussed at the aggregate level.
Chapters 1 and 2 have outlined the theory behind the inclusion of these variables; they will be
further analyzed in the following chapters.
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H1: Overall, following the economic crisis, approval ratings of membership in the EU
will decline in all of the sample countries.
H2: Countries that are euro-sharing will garner more positive evaluations of membership
in the EU after the economic crisis compared to the countries in the sample that are not
Eurozone members.
H3: Countries with significant increases in unemployment rates (those rising about 10
percent unemployment) following the economic crisis will have more positive evaluations
of membership in the EU compared to countries that maintained an unemployment rate
under 10 percent.
H4: Countries with significant decreases in GDP growth during the economic crisis will
have more positive evaluations of membership in the EU.
H5: In any given model, countries with political party power that is right-of-center on
economic issues will maintain a citizenry that garners overall more positive evaluations
of membership in the EU compared to those that have political party power left-of-center
on economic issues.

Individual-Level Hypotheses
At the individual level, three variables will be examined, age, economic winner/loser
status, and political ideology. Although the backlash of the 2008 economic crisis had nationallevel economic repercussions, citizens at the individual-level were affected economically as well.
An examination of public opinion at the individual-level is necessary in order to demonstrate
citizen response to the economic decline.
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H6: Younger citizens will have more positive evaluations of membership in the EU before
and after the economic crisis.
H7: Individuals who are economic losers will demonstrate lower levels of support for
membership in the EU compared to economic winners.
H8: Citizens who believe that membership in the EU means a loss of national identity will
maintain lower levels of support for membership in the EU compared to those who do not
across all models.
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CHAPTER FOUR: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

Individual-Level Analysis
This analysis examines seven individual-level independent variables: national level
economic prospects, age, gender, trust in the EU, national identity, economic winner/loser status,
and individual political ideology. Several studies have been conducted examining individual
level indicators of support for membership in the EU (Anderson and Reichert 1995; Cram 2009;
2012; Deutsch et al. 1957; Dobratz 1993; Esparza 2010; Hooghe and Marks 2009; Inglehart and
Rabier 1978; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007). However, since the 2008 global economic crisis
the literature has not addressed how public attitudes have been affected and which citizens in EU
member states remain pro-European and which do not. The objective of this analysis is to
determine the effect of the global economic decline on individual-level indicators of support for
the institution. Will the crisis negatively affect support? If so, which groups in society will
experience a greater change in attitudes? The following quantitative analysis will help to fill this
gap in the prior research.
Table 4 presents the results from the five multivariate ordered logistic regression models.
Each model, including all seven independent variables, is significant at the 0.000 level. The
coefficients for each model on the main independent variable, national level economic prospects,
remained positive in all five years with consistent levels of significance at the 0.000 level,
indicating that for every one unit increase in national level economic prospects (controlling for
all other variables) an increase in the logged odds of supporting membership in the EU can be
observed—by 0.408 in 2006, 0.554 in 2007, 0.472 in 2008, 0.308 in 2009, and 0.285 in 2010.
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Clearly, in 2009 and 2010 a significant decrease in the effect of national level economic
prospects on attitudes toward membership in the EU can be identified.

Table 4. Indicators of Support for Membership in the EU, Five Logit Models
Independent
Variables

Dependent Variable
Public Opinion on Membership in the EU
2006
0.408***
(0.048)

2007
0.554***
(0.044)

2008
0.472***
(0.044)

2009
0.308***
(0.047)

2010
0.285***
(0.043)

-0.002
(0.002)

-0.002
(0.002)

-0.004**
(0.002)

-0.005***
(0.002)

-0.005***
(0.002)

National Identity

0.900***
(0.065)

0.601***
(0.087)

0.645***
(0.088)

0.797***
(0.092)

0.598***
(0.081)

Economic
Winner/Loser Status

0.222***
(0.056)

0.297***
(0.050)

0.281***
(0.049)

0.253***
(0.053)

0.140**
(0.052)

Individual Political
Ideology

0.049***
(0.014)

0.059***
(0.012)

0.023*
(0.011)

0.064***
(0.011)

0.064***
(0.012)

-0.142*
(0.064)

-0.113*
(0.057)

-0.036
(0.056)

-0.161**
(0.055)

-0.102*
(0.051)

Trust in EU

2.150***
(0.075)

1.984***
(0.066)

2.205***
(0.067)

2.075***
(0.061)

2.043***
(0.060)

Intercept 0

-3.332***
(0.226)

-2.367***
(0.197)

-2.265***
(0.193)

-1.759***
(0.187)

-1.667***
(0.175)

Intercept 1

-6.084***
(0.242)
5,383
1,405.40
0.206
-3,897.68

-4.707***
(0.207)
6,713
1,553.21
0.176
-4,947.06

-4.730***
(0.203)
6,865
1,679.14
0.184
-5,098.82

-4.040***
(0.194)
6,856
1,683.61
0.169
-5,305.46

-4.179***
(0.184)
6,906
1,749.11
0.162
-5,658.38

National Level
Economic Prospects
Age

Gender

Observations
Wald χ2
Pseudo R2
− 2 Pseudo
Likelihood

Notes. Ordered logit coefficients are reported. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 in two-tailed tests. Greene’s (2003) formula is used to
calculate intercepts from ordered logit output.
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The coefficients and levels of significance for national-level economic prospects in each
model indicate support for hypothesis one—following the economic crisis beginning in the fall
of 2008, an overall decline across all cases in the approval of membership in the EU is apparent.
In a means comparison analysis, in all five models, this hypothesis is also supported. Individuals
who believed that the national economic prospects for the next twelve months would be better
than they were at the time of the survey demonstrated increasing levels of support for
membership in the EU in 2006, 2007, and 2008 but in 2009, and 2010 the mean dropped in both
cases. Individuals who believed that the national economic situation would remain the same in
the next twelve months began to demonstrate a decline in support for membership in the EU in
2008 and continued to demonstrate this trend in 2009 and 2010. An interesting finding is that
individuals who believed the national economic situation would get worse in the next twelve
months showed increasing support for membership in 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 but then
indicated a significant decline in average support in 2010 (see figure 7). The trend demonstrated
from 2006 until 2009, of individuals who believed that the national economic situation would get
worse in the next twelve months, indicates preliminary support for hypothesis four. A further
case by case analysis of these findings will be conducted later in this analysis.
In a comparison of individuals who believed that the economic prospects for the next
twelve months would be better than they currently were, to those who believed that they would
be worse, maintained on average greater support for the institution. The results of the means
comparison are in congruence with the prospective voting model proposed by MacKuen,
Erikson, and Stimson (1992). They argue, in an analysis of presidential popularity, that
“economic conditions affect…popularity only to the extent that economic conditions alter
expectations of the economic future” (MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992, 603).
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Mean Public Opinion on Membership in EU
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Figure 8. Means Comparison Analysis of National Level Economic Prospects on Public Opinion towards Membership in the EU, Five
Models
Notes. Values for the dependent variable are coded as follows: membership in the European Union is a “1=bad thing, 2=neither good
nor bad thing, 3=good thing.”
Source: Eurobarometer Public Opinion Survey, Spring Waves 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010
84

While the focus has typically been on the retrospective economic voting hypothesis, as indicated
in chapter one, unfortunately a variable measuring retrospective economic evaluations does not
exist in the Eurobarometer Public Opinion Survey. Therefore, the economic voting hypothesis
proposed by Fiorina (1978), and tested by multiple political scientists thereafter (Anderson 1995;
2000; Lewis-Beck 1988; Pacek and Radcliff 1995; Powell and Whitten 1993), cannot be tested
in this analysis due to insufficient public opinion data.
The findings in figure 1 also indicate that economic winner/loser status and feelings of
national identity are significant in all five models; age is significant in 2008, 2009, and 2010, but
is not a significant variable in the 2006 and 2007 models. Hypothesis 7 claims that individuals
who are economic losers will demonstrate lower levels of support for membership in the EU
compared to economic winners across all models—this hypothesis is supported by the ordered
logistic regression analysis and means comparison analysis of national level economic prospects
on public opinion towards membership in the EU controlling for economic winner/loser status.
Citizens who believe that their personal economic situation will be neither better nor worse in the
next twelve months demonstrate a 0.222 increase in the logged odds of supporting membership
in the EU in 2006, 0.297 in 2007, 0.281 in 2008, 0.253 in 2009, and 0.140 in 2010 compared to
citizens who believe that their economic situation will become worse in the next twelve months;
the same effect is apparent for citizens who believe that there economic situation will be better
during the next twelve months. Clearly, as citizens view themselves as economic winners, their
likelihood of supporting membership in the EU increases; this finding is congruent with Gabel’s
(1998) analysis of skilled and unskilled laborers—individuals who are more competitive in the
liberalized market (skilled laborers) are more likely to support EU membership than unskilled
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laborers, whom are less competitive. The effect of economic winner/loser status decreases after
the economic crisis in 2009 and again in 2010.
Hypothesis 8 is also supported by both analyses; the latter analysis measures the effect of
the independent variable on the dependent variable controlling for loss of national identity.
Citizens who do not fear that their country’s membership in the EU will result in the loss of
national identity are significantly more likely to support membership in the institution compared
to citizens who fear a loss of national identity. Following the 2008 economic crisis, the effect of
national identity on attitudes towards membership in the EU increased by 0.152 in the logged
odds. In 2010, that number decreased to 0.598, lower than any of the four other model years.
Lastly, age is significant in 2008, 2009, and 2010 with coefficients that are in the proper
hypothesized direction to support hypothesis 6 in all models. As the age of a citizen increases,
his or her likelihood to support membership in the EU decreases. For every one unit increase in
age (one year), a decrease in the logged odds of supporting membership in the EU can be
observed. In the three models that are significant, the effect of age on support for membership in
the EU increased by 0.001 in logged odds from 2008 to 2009 and remained the same from 2009
to 2010. Inglehart and Rabier (1978) suggest that due to value changes from a materialist to a
post-materialist society, younger, more educated citizens will demonstrate greater support for
membership in the EU compared to older generations. The literature review indicates that there
is a possible flaw in this argument. Shouldn’t citizens with materialist values (older citizens) be
more likely to support membership in the EU? Dobratz’s (1993) analysis is more telling of the
results from this analysis—history, not value change, affects public opinion towards membership
in the EU. Therefore, younger citizens who grew up in democratizing societies will be more

86

likely to support the institution than older generations who were more accustomed to
communism and socialist economic policies.

Aggregate-Level Analysis
This analysis examines four aggregate-level economic and political variables. Eurozone
status, unemployment rates, annual GDP growth rate, and political party power will be
evaluated. By looking at means comparisons for each model year on each of these four variables,
I will be able to draw conclusions on hypotheses two, three, four, and five.
Evidence supporting hypothesis two was found. In a means comparison of public opinion
towards membership in the EU between euro-sharing countries and non-euro sharing countries,
the results demonstrate that prior to and after the onset of the 2008 economic crisis, euro-sharing
countries (Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia) on average maintained more
positive evaluations of membership in the EU compared to non-euro sharing countries (Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania) (see table 5).
Prior to the economic crisis in 2006 and 2007, non-Eurozone members maintained more
positive evaluations of membership in the EU by a slight margin. However, beginning in 2008
this trend shifted, demonstrating the relationship that I hypothesized. Not only did Eurozone
members garner more positive evaluations towards membership in 2009 and 2010 but in a
combined average of opinions prior to the economic crisis (in 2006, 2007, and 2008) eurosharing countries maintained more positive evaluations before and after the crisis. The effect of
the shift in attitudes after 2008 was much greater for non-Eurozone members experiencing a
decline of 12.86 percent in the population that believed that membership in the EU was a good
thing. While Eurozone members also experienced a decline, their average only dropped by 9.06
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percent of the population. The economic strength of the Eurozone countries and the benefits of
sharing a common currency are factors that can explain these differences in attitudes toward the
institution.

Table 5. Percentage of the Population Believing that Membership in the EU is a “Good Thing,” a
Comparison of Eurozone and non-Eurozone Countries Before and After the Economic Crisis
Year
Eurozone Members
Non-Eurozone Members

Before the
Economic Crisis

2006
2007
2008
(Totals)

51.20%
43.50
53.21
49.30

52.09
45.09
45.95
47.71

After the Economic
Crisis

2009
2010
(Totals)

46.88
33.60
40.24

39.38
30.32
34.85

Difference
-9.06
-12.86
Source: Eurobarometer Public Opinion Survey, Spring Waves 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010

Papaioannou and Portes (2008) argue that Eurozone members benefit economically from
greater market liberalization, free trade, and stable exchange rates. Because the economy plays
such a significant role in the approval ratings of government institutions and political figures,
conventional wisdom would indicate that euro-sharing countries maintain greater approval of the
institution than those who do not benefit from a common currency. In order for a member state to
be eligible to implement the euro as national currency, it must meet certain criteria. The EC has
developed five standards called the convergence criteria and all member states of the EU
(besides Denmark and the United Kingdom) are required to meet these standards and adopt the
euro within a certain time frame after gaining membership. The five standards of the
convergence criteria are price stability, sound public finances, sustainable public finances,
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durability of convergence, and exchange rate stability (European Union 2014). These five
macroeconomic indicators are measured to ensure that inflation is controlled, national debts and
excessive deficits are not apparent, and that the country is able to maintain exchange rate
stability for at least two years prior to adopting the currency (European Union 2014). The six
countries in this sample that have not adopted the euro maintain weaker economies in the five
regards mentioned above and were more negatively affected by the financial crisis of 2008 which
explains their lower levels of support for the institution following the crisis. The following two
analyses will further measure these economic differences in terms of GDP annual growth and
unemployment rates over the five years for each country.
Regarding unemployment rates, in 2008, every country in the sample had below 10
percent unemployment. In 2009, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Hungary all rose
above double-digit unemployment; the Baltic States experienced the greatest increase in
unemployment rates following the economic crisis. Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Malta,
Poland, Romania, and Slovenia all maintained rates below 10 percent in 2009. In 2010 these
trends remained the same but Bulgaria rose above 10 percent. For the purpose of this analysis, I
will group countries falling above and below 10 percent unemployment in 2009 and 2010 in
order to measure public opinion towards membership in the EU in countries with high and low
unemployment rates.
Table 6 demonstrates a comparison of countries with high and low unemployment rates
and public opinion towards membership in the EU by model year. The findings suggest that, on
average, 59.54 percent of the surveyed population in countries with high unemployment rates
prior to the economic crisis, believed that membership in the EU was a good thing; 47.35 percent
of the population of countries with low unemployment rates, on average, believed that
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membership in the EU was a good thing. From these findings it is clear that prior to the
economic crisis, countries with higher unemployment rates, overall, garnered more approval by
the citizenry for membership in the EU. Following 2008, the same trend is apparent with the
difference between high unemployment countries and low unemployment countries remaining
the same. The average population supporting membership following the economic crisis declined
in both cases. These findings support hypothesis three.
In 2008, every country in the sample fell below the 10 percent unemployment rate
threshold established in this analysis. Therefore, data for 2008 was omitted from table 6 because
there is no variance among the sample. Countries that fall within the “low” category are not
considered to have experienced significant increases in unemployment rates between any of the
years in this analysis. A significant increase in unemployment rates is operationalized by
examining whether a country went from below 10 percent unemployment to above that rate in
the following year. The findings from this analysis cannot determine whether unemployment
rates are the cause of declining approval of membership in the EU.
Rather, they suggest that a trend is apparent in countries that suffer economically in terms
of unemployment rates. While it cannot be said that higher unemployment rates cause more
positive evaluations of membership in the institution, it also cannot be said that lower
unemployment rates cause opinions towards membership to become negative—this argument is
neither claimed nor substantiated by the evidence. In fact, Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) found
that citizens in member states of the EU (then the EC) do not tend to hold the institution
accountable for employment conditions within their country.
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Table 6. Percentage of the Population Believing that Membership in the EU is a “Good Thing,” a
Comparison High and Low Unemployment Countries Before and After the Economic Crisis
Year
Before the Economic
Crisis

After the Economic
Crisis

2006

High Unemployment
Rate
56.51%

2007
(Average)
2008
2009

62.56
59.54
-60.37

Low Unemployment
Rate
51.20
43.5
47.35
-46.88

2010
49.04
33.60
(Average)
54.71
40.24
Source: Eurobarometer Public Opinion Survey, Spring Waves 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010

Instead, citizens are more concerned with the financial relationship between the EU and their
country. The European Commission allots almost 50 percent of EU total spending to economic
growth in member states, specifically in job creation (European Commission 2014c). Therefore,
countries that benefit from EU financial aid disbursement in the area of job creation are more
likely to support membership in the institution because of these benefits. The comparison
conducted in table 6 supports this claim.
Another aggregate-level economic indicator that is included in this analysis is GDP
annual growth. Figure 1 demonstrates that in 2009 every country in the sample was negatively
affected. The Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) were hit the hardest with the
steepest drop in GDP annual growth to -14.1 percent in Estonia, -18 percent in Latvia, and -14.7
percent in Lithuania. Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic all fell
within -6.6 and -4.5 in growth in 2009, and Poland, Malta, and Cyprus never fell below -3
percent. In fact, Poland never experienced negative growth even after the onset of the economic
crisis in the fall of 2008. Because GDP is the best measure of the living standards within a
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country, this variable as a measure of national-level economic satisfaction at the individual-level,
besides household economic prospects, is the most telling of public approval of the economy and
government (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993). Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) establish a clear
differentiation between what unemployment and GDP measure regarding how the public is
affected—the former measures economic hardship and the latter measures economic well-being.
How salient are GDP annual growth rates to the general public? In order to measure the
effect of this variable on public opinion, Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) look at the net return
from the EU budget in each country and calculates that return (benefits minus payments) as a
percentage of the country’s GDP. For the purpose of this study, I will revert to the main
independent variable—national level economic prospects. Because this thesis seeks to measure
public opinion in its most reliable and accurate form, it necessary to rely on how individuals
perceive the health of the national economy and how these perceptions affect attitudes. A
discussion of this variable in the individual-level analysis has already taken place. This section
will examine public opinion in each country through a means comparison and measure the
results in conjunction with the GDP annual growth rates for each country in 2009 and 2010. Ttest statistics will also be employed as a measure of a 95 percent probability that the true
population means fall within a certain set of boundaries while maintaining significance.
First, I will discuss the results from the two sample t-tests with unequal variances for
2009 and 2010. Because hypothesis 4 is concerned with comparing public opinion across the
sample following the economic crisis only these two years will be examined. Measuring the
effect of national-level economic prospects on opinions towards membership in the EU, the ttests only consider the lowest value on the independent variable 1 (worse), and the highest value
3 (better). Again, these values indicate whether the respondent believes that national economic
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conditions will become worse in the next twelve months or better. In 2009, the mean for the
“worse” category in the entire sample is 2.28, and the “better” category is 2.58. The mean
difference for 2009 is -0.31 and is significant with the difference in the 95 percent confidence
interval falling between -0.329 and -0.283. The null hypothesis that individuals with different
values on national-level economic prospects will not vary in opinions towards membership in the
EU can be rejected; this hypothesis can also be rejected for 2010. Individuals in this model year,
who believed that the national-level economic prospects would be worse in the next twelve
months demonstrated a mean of 2.12 on the dependent variable; individuals who believed that it
would get better had a 2.53 mean score on opinions toward membership in the EU. The
relationship in 2010 is also significant with the difference in the 95 percent confidence interval
falling between -0.383 and -0.335; the null is again rejected. From this analysis it is obvious that
in 2009 and 2010, individuals who believed that the national economic situation would get worse
held more negative evaluations of the institution compared to those who believed it would get
better. To further argue and find support for hypothesis 4, a means comparison for each country
will be conducted.
Based on the results presented in figure 1, a clear trend is not apparent in the sample that
supports hypothesis four. The fourth hypothesis, which claims that countries with significant
decreases in GDP growth during and after the economic crisis will have more positive
evaluations of membership in the EU, is not substantiated. For example, Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania all experienced significant decreases in GDP growth—greater than any of the other
countries in the sample. However, it is clear that Latvia has the lowest means for support of the
institution. Estonia and Lithuania have more comparable trends but still do not represent the
highest mean approval of membership in the sample. Immediately following the economic crisis
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in 2009, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia maintained the highest mean in approval of the
institution with scores of 2.83, 2.83, and 2.82, respectively. Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, and
Malta came in with the second highest mean scores of 2.71, 2.71, 2.74, and 2.75, respectively.
The countries with the lowest mean scores in 2009 are Latvia and Slovenia with scores of
2.25 and 2.48, respectively. In 2010, as the economies of these countries continued to be
negatively affected, Poland (2.78) and Slovakia (2.80) continued to garner the most positive
sentiments towards the institution. Bulgaria (2.64), Estonia (2.64), Lithuania (2.60), Malta (2.66)
and Romania (2.67) also had overall positive feelings towards membership in the EU. The
countries with the lowest mean scores in 2010 are Cyprus (2.26), Latvia (2.35), and Slovenia
(2.41). Figure 9 and the mean scores discussed in this section are focused on the citizens who
believed that the national economic prospects for the next twelve months were good. The logic
behind the argument made in hypothesis four is that citizens in countries that experienced the
worst effects of the economic crisis in terms of GDP annual growth would find security in
membership in the EU and the economic support that the institution can provide through the
various financial programs discussed in chapter two. Figure 10 examines the response of citizens
who view national economic prospects getting worse in the next twelve months and their
opinions on membership in the EU.
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Figure 9. Means Comparison of Positive Prospective National Economic Evaluations and Membership in the EU
Note: 1 = “Worse” 2 = “Same” 3 = “Better” for dependent variable on y-axis
Source: Eurobarometer Public Opinion Survey, Spring Waves 2008, 2009, and 2010
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These findings, while they do not support my hypothesis, do give argument to the prospective
voting model. Instead of punishing the incumbent government (the European Parliament)
through retrospective economic evaluations, citizens evaluate policies proposed by the EU to
address the economic decline, and through a rational actor approach decide to turn away from the
institution if the policies will not benefit themselves or their country. Blame attribution could
have led citizens in CEE to point a finger at the EU as a cause of the economic hardships
experienced in each member state. If citizens believe that the EU is to blame for the economic
decline, they will begin to feel as though membership is a negative thing and that their country
would be better off functioning independently in economic terms. European citizens as rational
actors conduct cost benefit analyses of integration and membership in the EU (Eichenberg and
Dalton 1993). It then goes to reason that member states that experience significant economic
losses will punish the institution and a decline in support will become apparent.
The final aggregate-level political indicator of support to be examined is political party
power in national parliaments. Table 4 indicates that individual level political ideology is
significant in all five model years. Although the variable does not account for a large percent of
the variation in the dependent variable, it is still important to analyze. Cyprus, Lithuania, Malta,
Slovakia, and Slovenia, in all five model years experienced parliaments ruled by center-left
coalitions. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, and Poland maintained center-right
parliaments; and Bulgaria, Estonia, and Romania experienced shifting party power over the five
model years. Whether the causal arrow is from citizen-level political ideology to national-level
parliamentary make-up, or if political party power affects individual-level political opinions

97

cannot be determined. An observation of these two factors should indicate whether citizens in a
specific country tend to be pro-EU or eurosceptical.
The literature identifies that political ideology and party allegiance correlate with
opinions towards membership in the EU (Ehin 2001; Inglehart, Rabier, and Reif 1991). Citizens
who identify with center-right conservative parties are more likely to support integration and
membership in the EU than those that hold center-left liberal political beliefs (Ehin 2001). Based
on political party power, citizens in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, and Poland would be
overall more supportive of membership in the EU compared to Cyprus, Lithuania, Malta,
Slovakia, and Slovenia. The remaining countries in the sample should demonstrate varying
opinions towards membership in the EU.
Table 7 presents findings that support the literature regarding conservative and liberal
political ideologies as an indicator of support for membership in the EU. Citizens who identify
with left-of-center ideologies on average garner less supportive opinions toward membership in
the EU compared with right-of-center individuals. Economic policies and conditions can explain
this trend. Center-right policies support free-market economics and free-trade, which are
concepts that are promoted by the EU. Center-left economic beliefs are grounded in market
control and regulation by the government. The means comparison results presented in table 7
follow the conventional wisdom. However, in an examination of political parties on individuallevel ideologies, the effect might not be a strong one.

98

Table 7. A Means Comparison of Center-Right and Center-Left Controlled Parliaments:
Individual Ideology and Membership in the EU
Center-Right
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Controlled
Parliament
Left
2.31
2.04
2.23
2.04
1.98
(25.0%)
(22.3)
(33.1)
(29.4)
(28.4)
Center

2.44
(33.8)

2.27
(34.4)

2.32
(34.4)

2.19
(37.7)

2.08
(37.7)

Right

2.51
(41.2)
2006

2.55
(43.3)
2007

2.53
(32.6)
2008

2.58
(32.9)
2009

2.32
(33.9)
2010

2.20
(34.5)

2.07
(30.3)

2.22
(42.8)

2.18
(46.3)

1.95
(40.8)

Center

2.49
(28.6)

2.39
(34.7)

2.42
(26.8)

2.31
(25.3)

2.10
(27.0)

Right

2.52
(37.0)

2.70
(35.0)

2.55
(30.4)

2.10
(27.0)

2.20
(32.3)

Center-Left
Controlled
Parliament
Left

Notes. Frequencies are reported in parentheses under the mean scores.
Source: Eurobarometer Public Opinion Survey, Spring Waves 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010

In 2006 and 2007, countries that were dominated by center-right political coalitions in
parliament demonstrated an electorate with congruent beliefs. Notwithstanding, in 2008, 2009,
and 2010 the majority of voters identified with the center of the ideological spectrum. Many
factors within government could have caused this shift: restructuring of coalitions and party
platforms, elections held before the normal expiry of office, etc. The opposite trend can be
observed in an analysis of governments that are dominated by center-left political coalitions. In
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2006 and 2007, the majority of voters in these countries identified with the center-right on the
ideological spectrum. Yet, in 2008, 2009, and 2010 many respondents identified with left
ideologies. This change in political identification can be explained by the economic downturn.
When the economy is doing poorly, people tend to favor greater redistributive policies and
market control. It is important to note the somewhat even distribution of respondents on the
ideological response question. About one-third of the population in each year identified with left,
center, and right ideologies in each case. Therefore, it is difficult to make grounded claims that
political parties influence the values of the electorate to any specific extent.
All in all, strong evidence for hypothesis five is not apparent in the results. Countries
with political party power that is right-of-center in ideology do not, overall, garner more positive
evaluations of membership in the EU compared to those that have coalitions dominated by leftof-center political ideologies. While individual-level ideologies proved to be significant and
cause variation in public opinion toward membership in the EU (made evident by the ordered
logistic regression presented in table 4), the effect of political party power is not as apparent.
In conclusion, this multivariate analysis substantiated six of the eight hypotheses set forth
in this thesis. The results from the analysis on GDP annual growth rates and political party power
deserve further attention and analysis in future studies.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS
Since the creation of the EU in 1957, two enlargements have taken place introducing
twenty-two countries to the original six members of the organization. Currently, five countries—
Iceland, Montenegro, Serbia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Turkey—are in
the pre-accession phase and there are plans to introduce three more—Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and Kosovo—as potential candidates for membership. It is clear that the main goal
of the organization continues to be further enlargement in order to secure economic and political
stability within the region and create lasting peace in Europe. As a democratic institution, it is
important to consider public opinion and approval of the governmental body for many reasons.
Without public support, democratic institutions cannot thrive. Multiple scholars have studied
public approval of government for this very reason in order to identify indicators of public
support for government entities (Anderson 2000; Dahl 2000; Duch 2001; Duch and Stevenson
2008; 2010; Fishkin 1995).
This research has shown that public opinion towards membership in the EU did indeed
shift in a negative direction following the economic crisis. Findings from the means comparison
analyses of three aggregate-level economic indicators—Eurozone status, unemployment rates,
and annual GDP growth rate—illustrated trends that suggested support for hypotheses two and
three. Countries that are euro-sharing, overall, garnered more positive evaluations of membership
in the EU after the economic crisis. Also, countries with significant increases in unemployment
rates after the economic crisis maintained more positive evaluations of membership in the EU
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compared to countries with lower unemployment rates. The implications for these findings are
numerous.
In the aggregate, national-level economic decline affects public opinion in positive and
negative directions. Depending on the strength of a country’s economy, a global financial crisis
can have a more significant effect in one nation compared to another. The relationship between
the member states of the EU is unique in many ways. Economically speaking, the twenty-eight
members have a relationship that no other group of countries in the world has. Member states of
the EU share a very expansive and liberalized market, and an economic welfare system of a sort.
The European Development Fund, Structural and Cohesion Funds, and the European Social
Fund, all provide economic support for the EU’s members. While the budget is developed from
import duties on goods from outside of the Union, member states also pay in a percentage of
their gross national income (GNI)—specifically 0.73 percent—which accounts for two-thirds of
the overall budget (European Union 2014). Therefore, countries with higher GNI contribute
more to the budget than those with weaker economies. Because each member state of the EU has
a unique relationship with the institution economically, it is important to consider various
economic indicators of growth on a case by case basis, which is what Chapter 2 of this thesis
accomplished.
In a consideration of what declining support for the institution means for policy
implications, one can look at the 2014 EP elections as a result of shifting sentiments. The recent
election resulted in eurosceptics winning top seats in the UK and far right parties taking the fore
in France (BBC News Europe 2014). The platforms on which these parties have established
themselves focus on cutting back the powers of the EU, or “[abolishing] it completely” (BBC
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News Europe 2014). Rising euroscepticism in the region is attributed to the economic and
political fallout in the region since the 2008 global economic crisis. While the older member
states are developing feelings of discontent towards the institution—specifically France, and the
UK, and also Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Greece—newer member states are also beginning to
shift opinions in a similar direction. The difference between these two groups of nations, is that
the newer member states still rely on the economic support provided by the EU to get through
the financial crisis. Perhaps then, the sentiments in the older member states are more negative
because of the support that their economies have to provide for the even weaker economies (the
newer, post-communist member states)—future research can explore this possibility. Regardless
of which countries are more critical of the institution at this point, the reality is that public
opinion is continuing to shift in a negative direction. The rise of eurosceptical MEPs is indicative
of declining support for the powers of the institution.
The original goal in creating the EEC was to establish a community that was
economically connected and that would foster peaceful cooperation in all affairs. Thus far, the
EU has been successful in maintaining accord in the region. However, recent events in Ukraine
have also brought light to the importance of economic cooperation and support of EU functions.
During the fall of 2013, President Viktor Yanukovych of Ukraine refused to sign an Association
Agreement with the EU which resulted in widespread public discontent and street protests.
Originally peaceful in nature, the protests and street riots quickly turned violent in the capital as
a majority of the public supported their country’s relations with the EU (AP 2014). Many of the
economically weaker member states rely on the EU for financial support; this is true mostly for
post-communist member states that have growing free-market economies and young democratic
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institutions, as stated previously. The example given of the EU-Ukraine relationship is intended
to demonstrate how important public opinion regarding membership (or even solely a
relationship) in the EU is. For the citizens of post-communist Europe, the EU provides an
economic safety blanket and support for development and growth. If, for any reason, faith in the
institution declines, the results at the citizen level could be disastrous. In the case of Ukraine, the
opposite issue is apparent—but the example goes to demonstrate how powerful public opinion in
regard to the institution is. Examining these recent events—the 2014 EP elections and the
uprising in Ukraine—gives credence to the claims in this thesis that negative shifts in public
opinion in EU member states resulting from the global economic crisis could destroy the
legitimacy of the institution and ultimately result in its demise.
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APPENDIX A: EUROBAROMETER QUESTION WORDING
Note: The question wording of the dependent variable is consistent across all five surveys
employed for this thesis. The variable number is reported for each survey year before the listed
question. The surveys used for this thesis were the Eurobarometer Public Opinion Surveys 65.2,
67.2, 69.2, 71.3, 73.4.
EU Membership Good/Bad 65.2, 67.2, 69.2, 71.3, 73.4, respectively: v93, v123, v407, v205,
v206
“Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)’s membership in the European Union
is…?”
1 A good thing
2 Neither good nor bad
3 A bad thing
4 DK
5 Inap.
Recoded:
1 A bad thing
2 Neither good nor bad
3 A good thing
4 and 5 omitted
Expectations: National Economic Situation 65.2, 67.2, 69.2, 71.3, 73.4, respectively: v75, v85,
v90, v120, v123
“What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better,
worse, or the same when it comes to the economic situation in (OUR COUNTRY)?”
1 Better
2 Worse
3 Same
4 DK
5 Inap.
Recoded:
1 Worse
2 Same
3 Better
4 and 5 omitted
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Expectations: Household Financial Situation 65.2, 67.2, 69.2, 71.3, 73.4, respectively: v76,
v87, v91, v121, v124
“What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better,
worse, or the same when it comes to the financial situation of your household?”
1 Better
2 Worse
3 Same
4 DK
5 Inap.
Recoded:
1 Worse
2 Same
3 Better
4 and 5 omitted

EU Fears: Loss of National Identity 65.2: v136
“Some people may have fears about the building of Europe, the European Union. Here is a list of
things which some people say they are afraid of. For each one, please tell me if you, personally,
are currently afraid of it, or not: the loss of national identity and culture.”
1 Currently afraid of it
2 Not currently afraid of it
3 DK
Recoded:
3 omitted
EU Fears: Loss of National Identity 67.2, 69.2, 71.3, 73.4: v141, v229, v233, v288
“What does the European Union mean to you personally?”
-Loss of our national identity
0 Mentioned
1 Not mentioned
Recoded:
1 Mentioned
2 Not mentioned
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Trust in Institutions: EU 65.2, 67.2, 69.2, 71.3, 73.4, respectively: v91, v164, v215, v219, v273
“I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each
of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it.”
-The European Union
1 Tend to trust
2 Tend not to trust
3 DK
Recoded:
1 Tend not to trust
2 Tend to trust
3 omitted
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APPENDIX B: SUMMARY STATISTICS

2006 Summary Statistics on Dependent Variable
Country
Obs.
Cyprus
498
Czech Republic
1,052
Estonia
960
Hungary
986
Latvia
992
Lithuania
965
Malta
493
Poland
975
Slovakia
1,040
Slovenia
1,011
Source: Eurobarometer Public Opinion Survey 65.2
Note: Bulgaria and Romania gained membership in 2007

2006
Variable
Membership (v93)

Mean
2.35
2.43
2.43
2.39
2.21
2.51
2.26
2.50
2.48
2.49

Std. Dev.
0.749
0.660
0.650
0.666
0.686
0.684
0.767
0.624
0.615
0.611

Obs.
8,972

Mean
2.32

Std. Dev.
0.669

Min
1

Max
3

National Level Economic
Prospects (v75)

10,331

1.94

0.754

1

3

Age (v3311)

11,217

46.97

18.34

15

95

National Identity (v136)

10,431

1.62

0.486

1

2

Economic Winner/Loser Status
(v76)

10,822

2.04

0.674

1

3

Individual Political Ideology
(v3304)

7,912

5.50

2.39

1

10

Gender (v3310)

11,217

1.59

0.492

1

2

Trust in EU (v91)
9,590
1.68
Source: Eurobarometer Public Opinion Survey 65.2

0.467

1

2
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2007 Summary Statistics on Dependent Variable
Country
Obs.
Bulgaria
951
Cyprus
492
Czech Republic
1,029
Estonia
981
Hungary
976
Latvia
987
Lithuania
984
Malta
488
Poland
971
Romania
980
Slovakia
1,087
Slovenia
1,009
Source: Eurobarometer Public Opinion Survey 67.2

2007
Variable
Membership (v123)

Mean
2.51
2.26
2.32
2.61
2.19
2.22
2.58
2.34
2.63
2.64
2.56
2.47

Std. Dev.
0.644
0.739
0.687
0.605
0.723
0.687
0.622
0.769
0.589
0.590
0.609
0.654

Obs.
10,935

Mean
2.46

Std. Dev.
0.672

Min
1

Max
3

National Level Economic
Prospects (v85)

10,454

1.98

0.778

1

3

Age (v549)

11,264

47.13

18.14

15

97

National Identity (v141)

11,264

1.91

0.289

1

2

Economic Winner/Loser Status
(v87)

10,919

2.06

0.688

1

3

Individual Political Ideology
(v542)

8,037

5.64

2.43

1

10

Gender (v548)

11,264

1.59

0.491

1

2

Trust in EU (v164)
9,809
1.71
Source: Eurobarometer Public Opinion Survey 67.2

0.452

1

2
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2008 Summary Statistics on Dependent Variable
Country
Obs.
Bulgaria
952
Cyprus
498
Czech Republic
988
Estonia
976
Hungary
954
Latvia
973
Lithuania
974
Malta
490
Poland
959
Romania
951
Slovakia
1,063
Slovenia
988
Source: Eurobarometer Public Opinion Survey 69.2

2008
Variable
Membership (v143)

Mean
2.45
2.38
2.34
2.52
2.10
2.13
2.53
2.44
2.59
2.61
2.49
2.42

Std. Dev.
0.642
0.734
0.678
0.627
0.727
0.665
0.654
0.725
0.609
0.614
0.615
0.677

Obs.
10,766

Mean
2.42

Std. Dev.
0.678

Min
1

Max
3

National Level Economic
Prospects (v90)

10,462

1.79

0.769

1

3

Age (v768)

11,160

47.42

18.08

15

98

National Identity (v229)

10,160

1.90

0.299

1

2

Economic Winner/Loser Status
(v91)

10,864

1.95

0.709

1

3

Individual Political Ideology
(v761)

8,293

5.69

2.52

1

10

Gender (v767)

11,160

1.57

0.495

1

2

Trust in EU (v215)
9,565
1.71
Source: Eurobarometer Public Opinion Survey 69.2

0.454

1

2
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2009 Summary Statistics on Dependent Variable
Country
Obs.
Bulgaria
962
Cyprus
497
Czech Republic
1,069
Estonia
974
Hungary
960
Latvia
980
Lithuania
966
Malta
487
Poland
958
Romania
955
Slovakia
1,044
Slovenia
997
Source: Eurobarometer Public Opinion Survey 71.3

Mean
2.46
2.27
2.25
2.54
2.10
2.02
2.49
2.45
2.52
2.63
2.61
2.35

Std. Dev.
0.633
0.768
0.695
0.620
0.748
0.707
0.669
0.718
0.643
0.607
0.555
0.705

2009
Variable
Membership (v205)

Obs.
10,849

Mean
2.39

Std. Dev.
0.695

Min
1

Max
3

National Level Economic
Prospects (v120)

10,693

1.73

0.749

1

3

Age (v666)

11,245

47.22

17.96

15

94

National Identity (v233)

11,245

1.92

0.274

1

2

Economic Winner/Loser Status
(v121)

10,875

1.88

0.665

1

3

Individual Political Ideology
(v759)

8,059

5.65

2.51

1

10

Gender (v665)

11,245

1.58

0.494

1

2

Trust in EU (v219)
9,929
1.64
Source: Eurobarometer Public Opinion Survey 71.3

0.481

1

2
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2010 Summary Statistics on Dependent Variable
Country
Obs.
Bulgaria
942
Cyprus
500
Czech Republic
1,006
Estonia
976
Hungary
997
Latvia
970
Lithuania
974
Malta
488
Poland
967
Romania
978
Slovakia
1,021
Slovenia
990
Source: Eurobarometer Public Opinion Survey 73.4

Mean
2.41
2.05
2.13
2.45
2.22
2.05
2.36
2.20
2.54
2.50
2.52
2.23

Std. Dev.
0.640
0.791
0.678
0.624
0.699
0.681
0.722
0.796
0.645
0.694
0.624
0.717

2010
Variable
Membership (v206)

Obs.
10,809

Mean
2.32

Std. Dev.
0.705

Min
1

Max
3

National Level Economic
Prospects (v123)

10,532

1.88

0.758

1

3

Age (v556)

11,128

46.60

17.98

15

94

National Identity (v288)

11,128

1.90

0.301

1

2

Economic Winner/Loser Status
(v124)

10,739

1.93

0.652

1

3

Individual Political Ideology
(v548)

8,007

5.70

2.46

1

10

Gender (v555)

11,128

1.55

0.497

1

2

Trust in EU (v273)
9,937
1.60
Source: Eurobarometer Public Opinion Survey 73.4

0.490

1

2
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APPENDIX C: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS

Bulgaria
Membership –
Good/Bad
Bad

2007
78
(8.20)

2008
78
(8.19)

2009
73
(7.59)

2010
79
(8.39)

313
(32.91)

365
(38.34)

374
(38.88)

401
(42.57)

560
509
515
(58.89)
(53.47)
(53.53)
Total
951
952
962
(100.00)
(100.00)
(100.00)
Source: Eurobarometer Public Opinion Surveys 67.2, 69.2, 71.3, 73.4
Notes: Percentages are reported in parentheses below frequencies

462
(49.04)
942
(100.00)

Neither

Good

Cyprus
Membership –
Good/Bad
Bad

2006
83
(16.67)

2007
87
(17.68)

2008
75
(15.06)

2009
97
(19.52)

2010
145
(29.00)

160
(32.13)

191
(38.82)

158
(31.73)

167
(33.60)

187
(37.40)

255
214
265
233
(51.20)
(43.50)
(53.21)
(46.88)
Total
498
492
498
497
(100.00)
(100.00
(100.00)
(100.00)
Source: Eurobarometer Public Opinion Surveys 65.2, 67.2, 69.2, 71.3, 73.4
Notes: Percentages are reported in parentheses below frequencies

168
(33.60)
500
(100.00)

Neither

Good
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Czech Republic
Membership –
Good/Bad
Bad

2006
100
(9.51)

2007
130
(12.63)

2008
116
(11.74)

2009
159
(14.87)

2010
174
(17.30)

404
(38.40)

435
(42.27)

418
(42.31)

489
(45.74)

527
(52.39)

548
464
454
421
(52.09)
(45.09)
(45.95)
(39.38)
Total
1,052
1,029
988
1,069
(100.00)
(100.00)
(100.00)
(100.00)
Source: Eurobarometer Public Opinion Surveys 65.2, 67.2, 69.2, 71.3, 73.4
Notes: Percentages are reported in parentheses below frequencies

305
(30.32)
1,006
(100.00)

Neither

Good

Estonia
Membership –
Good/Bad
Bad

2006
85
(8.85)

2007
62
(6.32)

2008
70
(7.17)

2009
66
(6.78)

2010
69
(7.07)

374
(38.96)

263
(26.81)

328
(33.61)

320
(32.85)

400
(40.98)

501
656
578
588
(52.19)
(66.87)
(59.22)
(60.37)
Total
960
981
976
974
(100.00)
(100.00)
(100.00)
(100.00)
Source: Eurobarometer Public Opinion Surveys 65.2, 67.2, 69.2, 71.3, 73.4
Notes: Percentages are reported in parentheses below frequencies

507
(51.95)
976
(100.00)

Neither

Good
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Hungary
Membership –
Good/Bad
Bad

2006
101
(10.24)

2007
178
(18.24)

2008
207
(21.70)

2009
224
(23.33)

2010
159
(15.95)

395
(40.06)

430
(44.06)

440
(46.12)

414
(43.13)

463
(46.44)

490
368
307
322
(49.70)
(37.70)
(31.18)
(33.54)
Total
986
976
954
960
(100.00)
(100.00)
(100.00)
(100.00)
Source: Eurobarometer Public Opinion Surveys 65.2, 67.2, 69.2, 71.3, 73.4
Notes: Percentages are reported in parentheses below frequencies

375
(37.61)
997
(100.00)

Neither

Good

Latvia
Membership –
Good/Bad
Bad

2006
150
(15.12)

2007
148
(14.99)

2008
161
(16.55)

2009
236
(24.08)

2010
200
(20.62)

481
(48.49)

473
(47.92)

527
(54.16)

490
(50.00)

518
(53.40)

361
366
285
254
(36.39)
(37.08)
(29.29)
(25.92)
Total
992
987
973
980
(100.00)
(100.00)
(100.00)
(100.00)
Source: Eurobarometer Public Opinion Surveys 65.2, 67.2, 69.2, 71.3, 73.4
Notes: Percentages are reported in parentheses below frequencies

252
(25.98)
970
(100.00)

Neither

Good
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Lithuania
Membership –
Good/Bad
Bad

2006
105
(10.88)

2007
70
(7.11)

2008
87
(8.93)

2009
95
(9.83)

2010
141
(14.48)

267
(27.76)

274
(27.85)

282
(28.95)

301
(31.16)

339
(34.80)

593
640
605
570
(61.45)
(65.04)
(62.11)
(59.01)
Total
965
984
974
966
(100.00)
(100.00)
(100.00)
(100.00)
Source: Eurobarometer Public Opinion Surveys 65.2, 67.2, 69.2, 71.3, 73.4
Notes: Percentages are reported in parentheses below frequencies

494
(50.72)
974
(100.00)

Neither

Good

Malta
Membership –
Good/Bad
Bad

2006
97
(19.68)

2007
89
(18.24)

2008
68
(13.88)

2009
65
(13.35)

2010
115
(23.57)

170
(34.48)

143
(29.30)

138
(28.16)

140
(28.75)

159
(32.58)

226
256
284
282
(45.84)
(52.46)
(57.96)
(57.91)
Total
493
488
490
487
(100.00)
(100.00)
(100.00)
(100.00)
Source: Eurobarometer Public Opinion Surveys 65.2, 67.2, 69.2, 71.3, 73.4
Notes: Percentages are reported in parentheses below frequencies

214
(43.85)
488
(100.00)

Neither

Good
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Poland
Membership –
Good/Bad
Bad

2006
68
(6.97)

2007
55
(5.66)

2008
62
(6.47)

2009
78
(8.14)

2010
81
(8.38)

356
(36.51)

251
(25.85)

266
(27.74)

304
(31.73)

280
(28.96)

551
665
631
576
(56.51)
(68.49)
(65.80)
(60.13)
Total
975
971
959
958
(100.00)
(100.00)
(100.00)
(100.00)
Source: Eurobarometer Public Opinion Surveys 65.2, 67.2, 69.2, 71.3, 73.4
Notes: Percentages are reported in parentheses below frequencies

606
(62.67)
967
(100.00)

Neither

Good

Romania
Membership –
Good/Bad
Bad

2007
57
(5.82)

2008
66
(6.94)

2009
65
(6.81)

2010
114
(11.66)

241
(24.59)

240
(25.24)

221
(23.14)

305
(31.19)

682
645
669
(69.59)
(67.82)
(70.05)
Total
980
951
955
(100.00)
(100.00)
(100.00)
Source: Eurobarometer Public Opinion Surveys 67.2, 69.2, 71.3, 73.4
Notes: Percentages are reported in parentheses below frequencies

559
(57.16)
978
(100.00)

Neither

Good

117

Slovakia
Membership –
Good/Bad
Bad

2006
67
(6.44)

2007
68
(6.26)

2008
68
(6.40)

2009
36
(3.45)

2010
71
(6.95)

407
(39.13)

339
(31.19)

410
(38.57)

340
(32.57)

352
(34.48)

566
680
585
668
(54.42)
(62.56)
(55.03)
(63.98)
Total
1,040
1,087
1,063
1,044
(100.00)
(100.00)
(100.00)
(100.00)
Source: Eurobarometer Public Opinion Surveys 65.2, 67.2, 69.2, 71.3, 73.4
Notes: Percentages are reported in parentheses below frequencies

598
(58.57)
1,021
(100.00)

Neither

Good

Slovenia
Membership –
Good/Bad
Bad

2006
62
(6.13)

2007
90
(8.92)

2008
106
(10.73)

2009
134
(13.44)

2010
167
(16.87)

393
(38.87)

352
(34.89)

358
(36.23)

381
(38.21)

429
(43.33)

556
567
524
482
(55.00)
(56.19)
(53.04)
(48.35)
Total
1,011
1,009
988
997
(100.00)
(100.00)
(100.00)
(100.00)
Source: Eurobarometer Public Opinion Surveys 65.2, 67.2, 69.2, 71.3, 73.4
Notes: Percentages are reported in parentheses below frequencies

394
(39.80)
990
(100.00)

Neither

Good
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